

Transnational Climate Change Governance

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Introduction

Climate change is an area of increasingly complex multi-level governance. Traditionally, international relations scholars have assumed that issues such as climate change, seen to be “global” in scope, required some form of “global” governance. Given the characteristics of the international system, scholars and practitioners alike viewed multilateral agreements negotiated by national governments as the central mechanism for global environmental governance. Today, we understand the governance of global environmental issues to be much more complex than initially envisioned. It is multifaceted, with governance mechanisms taking on a variety of forms beyond multilateral agreements. Moreover, authority is diffuse across levels of social organization and types of actors.

The complexity of global environmental governance is clearly illustrated in the case of climate change. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol exemplify intergovernmental cooperation. National governments develop and implement climate policies within a context of national politics and institutions, sometimes under the umbrella of the international climate change regime (e.g. in the case of the European Union) but not always (e.g. the United States). European Union countries function within an additional layer of regional, supranational cooperation that covers climate along with many other politics. Sub-national authorities have become active players in the climate change policy arena in a number of countries, often ahead of central governments. In the private sphere, both non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and corporations have initiated programs to shape public understandings of climate change and to develop innovative policies and technologies for controlling greenhouse gas emissions. Amongst these relatively well documented forms of governance, there is a growing trend of transnational climate cooperation involving cities, states, regions, NGOs, corporations, and government agencies.

This paper seeks to develop a framework for systematically documenting and analyzing these emerging forms of transnational governance.² In the first section, we establish a working definition of transnational governance that clarifies who engages in transnational governance, where it occurs, and what it means to govern. We review how the concept of governance has

¹ An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2007 annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, IL, 1 March. We are grateful to Frank Biermann and Dimitris Stevis for their helpful comments.

² It is the product of an ongoing, transnational, virtual conversation in which we aim to integrate empirical findings from our individual research on transnational climate change governance and to raise debate on the notion of transnational governance.

emerged outside the discipline of international relations and position current approaches to global governance within this context. We also draw on the literature on multilevel governance to locate the transnational political sphere. We argue that transnational governance is characterized not only by the types of actors involved and the nature of the political arena, but also through the presence of governance functions. Not all transnational relations signify transnational governance. Specifically, we contend that *transnational governance occurs when networks operating in the transnational political sphere purposively steer constituent members to act*. In the second section, we discuss the development of transnational governance in the area of climate change and introduce a typology for documenting its various forms. We distinguish between public, private and hybrid transnational networks and three types of governance functions: information sharing, capacity building and implementation, and rule setting. In the conclusion, we propose a future research agenda for the study of transnational climate change governance.

Defining transnational governance

Transnational relations are not a new phenomenon. Direct cross-border contacts of businessmen, bureaucrats, aristocracy, elites, intellectuals, and revolutionaries have been and remain a part of the international system. Keohane and Nye (1971) first drew attention to the contemporary significance of these cross-border transactions and networks, which they defined as "...contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of governments." Scholarly interest in transnational relations proved transient during the 1970s and through much of the Cold War. Since the 1990s, however, there has been a renewed vigor in the study of transnational actors and networks (Risse-Kappen 1995). This research agenda has become increasingly compelling with the advent of globalization and the unprecedented thickening of transnational interactions in most spheres of societal and political life.

The transnational relations literature has made great strides in analyzing the role of transnational actors and networks in international affairs. It has illuminated the transnational strategies and influence of multinational corporations (Choucri 1993, Garcia-Johnson 2000), advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Mathews 1997, Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, True and Mintrom 2001, Wapner 1996), epistemic communities (Haas 1989), and government bureaucrats (Slaughter 1997, Steinberg 2001). This literature has placed an emphasis on understanding transnational actors as agents of change. Less systematic attention has been given to the extent to which this constitutes transnational *governance*. We argue that those transnational networks which have a governing function have contributed to the emergence of a distinct arena of global governance.

Within the realm of global environmental politics, scholars are increasingly turning their attention away from a focus on regimes – which have traditionally attracted the lion's share of intellectual attention – and towards an engagement with the notion of global governance. The term "governance" has attracted attention across a broad range of disciplines, which, combined with its growing popularity, has produced a multiplication of interpretations. In its broadest sense, governance is seen to incorporate a diversity of governing processes, including those associated with the state (hierarchy), co-ordination and co-operation among social and political actors, as well as self-governing mechanisms (Kooiman 2003). Governance is used to "refer to the modes

and practices of the mobilisation and organisation of collective action” (Coafee and Healy 2003: 1979), conceived as “the instituted process” that is created by and serves to guide processes of governing (Lowndes 2001: 1961). Governing can be defined as “purposive acts of ‘steering’ a society or polity” (Lowndes 2001: 1961; see Bulkeley et al. 2007). Governance can be used to capture the diversity of means through which governing is accomplished – it is (more) than the sum of the governing parts. An alternative approach has been to place governance in contradistinction to government. In this view, “governance is seen as a means of governing which necessarily involves non-state actors, either acting in self-governing networks or in partnership with state bodies, and is defined in opposition to hierarchical forms of authority associated with the processes and institutions of government” (Bulkeley et al. 2007). The possibility therefore arises of “governing without government” (Rhodes 1996).

In the literature on global governance, it has been the first, broad interpretation which has dominated analysis. Broadly speaking we can say that the term governance “implies a focus on ‘systems of governing,’ means for ‘authoritatively allocating resources and exercising control and co-ordination’ (Rhodes 1996: 653), in which the state (or government) is not necessarily the only or most important actor” (Bulkeley and Betsill 2003: 9). Governance is seen to represent the “sum of the many ways that individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs” (O’Brien et al. 2000: 9). In other words:

Governance occurs on a global scale through both the co-ordination of states and the activities of a vast array of rule systems that exercise authority in the pursuit of goals and that function outside normal national jurisdictions. Some of the systems are formalised, many consist of essentially informal structures, and some are still largely inchoate, but taken together they cumulate to governance on a global scale (Rosenau 2000: 172).

We suggest that in order for an actor or network to be undertaking governance, they must perform a *governance function*. Not all transnational networks govern. Many contribute to global governance by seeking to influence others (think, for example, of transnational advocacy networks, business lobby groups, and epistemic communities). However, other transnational networks seek to govern directly—through purposively steering constituent members or populations to act. The result is what we refer to as *transnational governance*.

Discussions of multilevel governance complement this broad understanding of global governance by helping to conceptualize its complexity and identify the myriad actors and arenas that comprise global governance (Hooghe and Marks 2003). The literatures on multilevel governance and transnational relations have developed in parallel rather than in dialogue. As a consequence, there has not been an attempt to examine transnational governance networks within the framework of multilevel governance systems. We contend the concept of multilevel governance can help us situate the transnational political arena in relation to other governance arenas.

Most discussions of multilevel governance identify two types, which highlight the various tiers and spheres at which governance takes place. The first form of multilevel governance emphasizes arrangements in territorially defined political jurisdictions, from the local to the

international level, where public actors (governments) have primary authority to govern. Examples include intergovernmental organizations, national strategies, and municipal policies and programs. These forms of governance have been the focus of much political science scholarship and are generally well-documented. However, transnational forms of governance are not easily captured by this first conception of multilevel governance because the transnational sphere does not represent a distinct, territorially defined political jurisdiction, and there is considerable uncertainty about who has the authority to govern within this sphere.

The second type of multilevel governance is more amorphous and focuses on the spheres in which governance occurs. These types of arrangements involve public and/or private sector actors (e.g. NGOs and firms) organized around specific tasks, often working across levels of political jurisdiction and geographic territory. It is much easier to map the transnational sphere onto this second conception of multilevel governance. Recent studies have analyzed examples of this second type of multilevel governance, including transgovernmental networks (Slaughter 2004), municipal networks for climate governance (Bulkeley and Betsill 2003), private certification programs (Cashore et al. 2004; Gereffi et al. 2001), and public-private partnerships (Andonova and Levy 2003, Kaul and Conceicao 2005, Ruggie 2002).

In sum, transnational governance occurs when networks operating in the transnational political sphere purposively steer constituent members or populations to act. Transnational governance networks are an important component of global governance. They form an increasingly dense layer of governance, which can be compared to a transmission belt, linking governance systems from the global to the local, as well as across the public and private spheres. This conceptualization is indeed broad, as it captures diverse phenomena. In the following section we turn to a discussion of how transnational governance has developed around the issue of global climate change. We use the climate policy arena to specify both who governs through transnational networks, as well as what kinds of governance functions these networks perform.

The transnationalization of climate change governance

The transnationalization of governance is a phenomenon not constrained to climate change.³ However, climate change is among the governance arenas likely to lend themselves more readily to the emergence of these forms of governance. First, it is an arena densely populated by advocacy organizations and increasingly by transnational business organizations with interests in climate-related governance and diffusion of technology. The presence of an increasing number and diverse set of transnational actors is likely to make climate change governance more permeable to direct influence and governance initiatives of non-state actors. Other governance areas such as development assistance, international financial cooperation, humanitarian assistance and environmental cooperation more broadly are similarly characterized by a relatively strong presence of non-state actors with interest in and capacity for governance.

Second, the climate change arena is also characterized by a great degree of complexity and need for coordination of policies vertically as well as horizontally. Unlike other environmental

³ Other examples include coordination of monetary policy among central bankers (Slaughter 2004), security, athletics and union activity. We are grateful to participants at the International Studies Association conference (where a version of this paper was presented) for these suggestions.

policies that often focus on one industry or several sets of actors, climate change governance has to involve multiple sectors often with divergent interests and roles. This makes the disaggregation of interests around more narrowly defined issues of climate-related cooperation more likely. This, in turn, provides opportunities for cross-border cooperation among actors focused on similar aspects of the issue. The emergence of issue-specific governance mechanisms focused on adaptation, renewable energy, market mechanisms, or reporting illustrate these opportunities. Transnational networks for climate change thus very rarely try to tackle the issue in its entire complexity. They tend to focus on a narrower set of governance objectives within the larger puzzle of climate governance.

Third, the nature of the intergovernmental regime for climate change itself creates mechanism and opportunities that facilitate transnational governance. Most significantly the adoption of the three flexible mechanisms (CDM, JI and emissions trading) has opened the regime directly to transnational actors interested to get involved in the mechanisms. The implementation of these flexible mechanisms has necessitated the building of a range of governance structures to support the new markets in emission reduction units and technology. Such institution building requires diverse skills and inevitably creates opportunities for cross-border cooperation between government agencies, IGOs, and a range of non-state actors.

Finally, the political landscape of global climate change governance provides a terrain for the building of transnational governance networks. With some key players outside the regime (US, China, and India for example) and others inside (in particular the EU), there have been efforts made to integrate sub-national and other actors from “outside” the regime into coalitions of the willing (for example, this was the original *raison d’être* of the Climate Group, and lies behind the UK-California initiative, and the Climate Group’s cities initiative – C40). Moreover, the absence of involvement by some nation-states has created political space for sub-national governments, particularly in the US and Australia, to carve out political niches for climate mitigation. Here, the building of transnational networks for governance has in large part been an attempt to counter criticisms that such efforts are irrelevant in relation to the scale of the problem.

In sum, while climate change governance is not a special case uniquely fit for transnational governance, it offers an arena conducive for such forms of governance. Examining the diversity of transnational governance mechanisms that emerge within the climate regime is likely to provide us with a rich basis for analysis, which could then be extended to other issue areas as well.

A typology of transnational climate change governance

To begin understanding systematically the different modalities of transnational governance and their role in global climate change governance, we have developed a typology of transnational governance networks. The typology takes a cumulative perspective on different forms of transnational governance and presents an effort to map the scope of this relatively amorphous phenomenon. It enables us to examine the different forms of transnational governance and how they relate to each other. It also seeks to specify exactly what types of governance functions are typically supplied by transnational networks and how. This broad conceptualization and typology also provides a tool to examine the interplay between transnational and other types of arrangements in our analysis of climate change governance.

The proposed typology uses two criteria to categorize transnational forms of governance and illustrates them with examples from the climate change arena (Table 1).⁴ The first criterion has to do with the types of actors involved in transnational governance networks. One of the distinctive characteristics of transnational governance is that it is no longer just an affair of states as unitary actors, but involves a variety of non-state and state actors in different capacities and configurations. At one end of the spectrum, we identify purely *public transnational governance networks*. These governance mechanisms are established by and for public actors such as sub-units of government, city or local governments, legislators, judges, or units of intergovernmental organizations without the mediation of states' foreign policy establishments. Examples of public transnational governance for climate change include the Cities for Climate Change Program (CCP) and the New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers (NEG/ECP) coalition on climate change. The CCP's members consist of more than 600 local governments from 30 countries, each of whom has committed to controlling greenhouse gas emissions within their jurisdiction (Bulkeley and Betsill 2003). The NEG/ECP was established in 1973 to facilitate cross-border regional cooperation between the governors of six New England states and five eastern Canadian provinces. In 2001, members adopted a climate change action plan (Selin and VanDeveer 2005).

Table 1. Typology of Transnational Governance Networks

Type of Actors	Public	Hybrid	Private
Function			
Information sharing		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Climate Group 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pew BELC • WBCSD
Capacity building & Implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CF-ASSIST 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCF • REEEP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IETA
Rule setting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CCP • NEG/ECP Climate Action Program 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CCX • ACEA-EU agreement • Greenhouse Gas Protocol Initiative 	

At the other end of the spectrum stand *private transnational governance networks*, a term by which we mean transnational networks established and managed by non-state actors only. Such transnational governance mechanisms can grow out of transnational advocacy networks once these actors establish or get involved in governance functions. Examples in the climate change arena include the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA); the climate governance activities of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), as well as a variety of climate governance programs of environmental NGOs seeking to diffuse climate-friendly technology. IETA is a network of 145 international companies dedicated to establishing

⁴ See Appendix 1 for brief descriptions of the initiatives and clarification of our coding scheme.

an open and fair market-based trading system for greenhouse gases (<http://www.ieta.org>). The WBCSD brings together 190 CEOs of international firms to address issues of business and sustainable development (<http://www.wbcsd.org>). Their climate work seeks to find innovative ways for businesses to address climate change. Private transnational governance networks populated by actors from the business sector often, although not always, promote market mechanisms of governance as illustrated by the rapid proliferation of environmental certification institutions more broadly.

Finally, there has been growing collaboration between public and private transnational actors, resulting in *transnational hybrid networks*. In this category, actors from both the public as well as the non-state sectors establish joint programs with a set of governance objectives. Examples include the voluntary agreement between the European Commission and the association of European, Japanese and Korean car manufacturers to voluntarily limit CO₂ emissions from automobiles, the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), and the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF). The CCX is a voluntary cap and trade system whose members include private firms, NGOs, universities and state and local governments in North America (<http://www.chicagoclimateex.com>). The PCF, which was established by the World Bank in 2000, facilitates coordination between 17 companies and 6 governments in developing emissions reductions projects (<http://www.carbonfinance.org>).

The second dimension along which we build our typology of transnational governance networks has to do with the primary functions they perform. We believe this dimension is particularly important as the typology seeks to specify not only who participates in transnational networks, but also the means through which these networks govern and promote norm diffusion, consensus building or the reevaluation of actor goals, practices and behavior. Our typology distinguishes three broad types of functions provided by transnational governance networks: information sharing, capacity building and implementation, and rule setting. As discussed above, this aspect of the typology seeks to give more substance and concrete meaning to the term transnational governance. It is also a mechanism to allow for later empirical investigation into how transnational governance clusters in terms of functions and how these functions compare to other forms of governance. We recognize that there is considerable overlap among these three broad functions, and that some networks may engage in all three. There is hardly a capacity building or rule setting transnational governance effort that does not also involve some element of information sharing. In Table 1, we have categorized networks according to their *primary* governance function.

Information sharing is a central function in many transnational governance networks. In transnational governance networks, *information sharing* is a mechanism to achieve governance functions such as norm diffusion, consensus building, or the reevaluation of actor goals, practices, and behavior. For example, the Climate Group (whose members include public and private actors) and the WBCSD help members control greenhouse gas emissions by providing information and expertise on new technologies. Outside the climate change arena, the UN Global Compact is a prominent example of a public-private governance network based on information sharing. The Global Compact uses information sharing as a tool to diffuse existing norms embedded in UN documents in business strategies and practices across the globe.

It is also important to reiterate an earlier point that information sharing among transnational actors that only facilitates transnational organization and lobbying does not constitute transnational governance. In this case, information sharing does not serve a direct governance purpose. The activities of the Climate Action Network, which facilitates NGO lobbying for climate change policy, or the already disbanded Global Climate Coalition, which facilitated lobbying by large corporations against climate policies, thus are not forms of transnational climate change governance.

The second category of *capacity building and implementation* captures a range of activities with explicit governance scope. These types of transnational governance activities often take place in reference to an explicit set of already agreed upon intergovernmental or domestic rules and norms and seek to enhance the capacity of actors to implement them effectively. Examples in the climate arena include the World Bank's PCF as well as the CF-Assist programs of the Environment Department of the World Bank, which are designed to help developing countries participate in the flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol.

Finally, *rule setting* transnational governance networks typically contribute to climate governance by establishing a new set of rules and norms intended to guide and constrain members' behavior. These could emerge in parallel to existing inter-governmental or domestic rules and norms or as a substitute in the absence of rules and norms in the international or domestic sphere. This type of transnational governance mimics traditional systems of inter-governmental and domestic governance in terms of function, although through a different configuration of authority. Examples include the NEG/ECP Climate Action Program, the CCX, and the CCP networks. All these initiatives have emerged in parallel to the intergovernmental regime on climate change. However, these initiatives link actors across boundaries and layers of governance to establish a set of rules not necessarily envisaged or specified by the UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol but serving the general goals of climate change mitigation and management.

One interesting pattern that already emerges from this exercise is that not all boxes in the typology can be easily filled, while some host multiple cases. This is partly because the project is in its early stages and it seeks to encompass a broad and so far little explored arena of climate change governance. The table also raises the possibility, however, that some of those typological boxes will become densely populated as we sift through the multitude of transnational governance initiatives for climate change, while other will remain sparsely populated. One of the objectives of this project is not only to provide a systematic way of studying transnational governance, but also to uncover which forms are more prevalent, why, and to what effect.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have attempted to argue that transnational governance is a distinct form of global governance, consisting of transnational actors operating in a distinct political sphere in which public and private actors interact across national borders and political jurisdictions. Importantly, these actors must be engaged in governance functions to constitute transnational governance networks. We find this perspective allows us to begin to document and analyze emerging forms of governance that have become prominent in the area of global climate change and to understand how they are situated in relation to other forms of climate change governance. We have developed a typology of transnational climate change governance that differentiates

between different forms of transnational governance in terms of the types of actors participating and the governance functions performed.

The empirical task of capturing such a broad, amorphous phenomenon is challenging. Our typology of transnational governance will serve as a guiding tool for future analysis. One of our next steps will be to populate the typology with additional examples of transnational climate change governance networks. We plan to draw on a database being compiled by the Tyndall Center on climate change actions outside the nation state. We are not necessarily concerned with identifying the entire population of transnational climate change governance networks; the political landscape in this issue area changes dramatically on a daily basis, which would make this a thankless task. Instead, we wish to explore some general trends, such as whether some cells are populated more or less densely and why.

We also plan to select cases from the different cells and investigate a range of questions about transnational governance. For example, we are interested in why actors choose to participate in transnational governance networks and what these networks tell us about shifts in authority and the role of the national state in governing global issues such as climate change. We will investigate how governance occurs within transnational governance networks, looking at the sources of legitimacy and the challenges in working across boundaries. We will also consider how to assess the effectiveness of transnational forms of governance. In the case of climate change, we are interested in direct effects on GHG emissions as well as indirect effects on other forms of climate change governance. We will also examine the politics that are created when transnational governance networks intersect with one another and with other forms of governance.

This work will likely consist of a series of single and comparative case studies. One possibility is a comparative study of transnational hybrid networks that perform different governance functions (the Climate Group, the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership, and the CCX), which would draw on previous research conducted by each of us individually. Examining different forms of transnational climate change governance will allow us to see whether there are some commonalities and/or important distinctions.

This research may also have implications for our understanding of the phenomenon of transnational governance more broadly. Are the forms of transnational governance identified in the climate change issue area similar to those found in other issue areas? Are some forms of transnational governance more common than others, and if so, why? Are some governing strategies and approaches more effective than others? Finally, how significant is transnational governance compared to other forms of governance?

Appendix I

CATEGORIES USED FOR CODING

TRANSNATIONAL = involves at least one set of actors that don't represent national governments → *if doesn't fulfill this criteria, then not part of study population*

PUBLIC = members are *only* from the public sector

HYBRID = members are from the public *and* private sectors

PRIVATE = members are *only* from the private sector

INFORMATION SHARING = primarily interested in providing information to help members learn about an issue and make decisions.

CAPACITY BUILDING AND IMPLEMENTATION= intended primarily to increase the technical, financial, and human resources of members to enhance their governance capacity and ability to implement rules and norms established *outside* the network.

RULE SETTING = engage in a form of self-governance where rules/standards are established *within* the network

FORMS OF TRANSNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE GOVERNANCE

CLIMATE GROUP (quotes from website):

- “diverse group of companies, governments and supporters” = **HYBRID**
- “We promote the development and sharing of expertise on how business and government can lead the way towards a low carbon economy whilst boosting profitability and competitiveness.” = **INFORMATION SHARING**

CCP (quotes from website)

- “More than 650 local governments participate in the CCP, integrating climate change mitigation into their decision-making processes.” = **PUBLIC**
- “The campaign is based on an innovative performance framework structured around five milestones that local governments commit to undertake. The milestones allow local governments to understand how municipal decisions affect energy use and how these decisions can be used to mitigate global climate change while improving community quality of life.” = **RULES BASED**

CCX (quotes from website):

- “The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) is North America's only, and the world's first, greenhouse gas (GHG) emission registry, reduction and trading system for all six greenhouse gases (GHGs). CCX is a self-regulatory, rules based exchange designed and governed by CCX Members.” = **RULES BASED**
- Members include private sector, state governments, local governments and universities = **HYBRID**

CF-ASSIST

- “CF-Assist is a capacity building and technical assistance program established by the World Bank in fiscal year 2005 to enable the full engagement of developing countries and economies in transition in the carbon market. As part of the World Bank’s endeavor toward market development, CF-Assist is aimed at assisting interested countries in the development and implementation of projects under the CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) and JI (Joint Implementation), or to access International Emissions Trading (EIT) of the Kyoto Protocol.” = **CAPACITY BUILDING/IMPLEMENTATION; PUBLIC**

EU-EUROPEAN AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION (ACEA) AGREEMENT (from http://www.acea.be/acea_1998_commitment)

- “ACEA Commitment on CO2 emission reductions from new passenger cars in the framework of an environmental agreement between the European Commission and ACEA” = **HYBRID**
- “Some members of ACEA will introduce in the EU market, not later than 2000, models emitting 120 g CO2/km or less, measured according to Directive 93/116/EC (see Technical Annex, Point 1 Measuring Procedure).” = **RULES BASED**

GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL INITIATIVE (from <http://www.ghgprotocol.org/DocRoot/DVrpAGhiJbdwkONJSrse/Brochure.pdf>)

- “The Greenhouse gas Protocol Initiative is a multi-stakeholder partnership of businesses, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), governments, academics, and others convened by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and the World Resources Institute (WRI).” = **HYBRID**
- “...the Initiatives mission is to develop international accepted greenhouse gas (GHG) accounting and reporting standards and/or protocols, and to promote their broad adoption.” = **RULES BASED**

INTERNATIONAL EMISSIONS TRADING ASSOCIATION (IETA) (quotes from website)

- “As of January 2007, IETA comprises 145 International Companies from OECD and non-OECD countries.” = **PRIVATE**
- “IETA will work for: the development of an active, global greenhouse gas market, consistent across national boundaries and involving all flexibility mechanisms: the Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation and emissions trading; the creation of systems and instruments that will ensure effective business participation.” = **CAPACITY BUILDING & IMPLEMENTATION**

NEG/ECP

- “The Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers (NEG/ECP) is a unique and highly effective international relationship of states and provinces sharing ideas and building on historic ties. The Conference advances the interests of the eleven jurisdictions through cooperation and encourages collaboration with the private sector.” = **PUBLIC** (<http://www.cap-cpma.ca/default.asp?mn=1.62.4.28>)

- “With the Climate Change Action Plan, the NEG/ECP made a commitment to take serious steps to address climate change by setting specific greenhouse gas reduction targets for the region.” = **RULES BASED** (<http://www.neg-ecp-environment.org/page.asp?pg=46>)

PEW CENTER BUSINESS ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP COUNCIL (BELC)

(quotes from website)

- “The Pew Center’s Business Environmental Leadership Council (BELC) was created at the Center’s inception under the belief that business engagement is critical for developing efficient, effective solutions to the climate problem. We also believe that companies taking early action on climate strategies and policy will gain sustained competitive advantage over their peers.” = **INFORMATION SHARING**
- “The BELC is now the largest U.S.-based association of corporations focused on addressing the challenges of climate change, with 42 members representing \$2.4 trillion in market capitalization and over 3.3 million employees. Many different sectors are represented, from high technology to diversified manufacturing; from oil and gas to transportation; from utilities to chemicals. This section of our site provides information on the activities and contributions of BELC members as well as business and climate resources.” = **PRIVATE**

PROTOTYPE CARBON FUND (quotes from website)

- “A partnership between seventeen companies and six governments, and managed by the World Bank, the PCF became operational in April 2000.” = **HYBRID**
- “The PCF, with the operational objective of combating climate change, aspires to promote the Bank’s tenet of sustainable development, demonstrate the possibilities of public/private partnerships, and offer a "learning-by-doing" opportunity to its stakeholders.” = **CAPACITY BUILDING & IMPLEMENTATION**

REEEP (quotes from website)

- “Backed by more than 200 national governments, businesses, development banks and NGOs, REEEP is uniquely placed to contribute to international, national and regional policy dialogues.” = **HYBRID**
- “Our aim is to accelerate the integration of renewables into the energy mix and to advocate energy efficiency as a path to improved energy security and reduced carbon emissions, ensuring socio-economic benefits.” = **CAPACITY BUILDING AND IMPLEMENTATION**

WORLD BUSINESS COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (quotes from website on Energy and Climate Project)

- “The WBCSD’s Energy and Climate project has already started working on developing innovative ways for business to address global warming within a sustainable development framework in 1999. By devising practical mechanisms, measurement tools, and market-based solutions, the project helps companies reduce the impact of their operations today. And it helps them prepare for a carbon-constrained future by exploring the energy frameworks, sources, and technologies that will be needed tomorrow.” = **INFORMATION SHARING**
- “The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) is a CEO-led, global association of some 190 companies dealing exclusively with business and sustainable development.” = **PRIVATE**

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