

From Stockholm to Johannesburg and Beyond: The Evolving Meta-Regime for Global Environmental Governance

Kate O'Neill

**University of California at Berkeley
Department of Environmental Science, Policy and Management
Society and Environment Division
207 Giannini Hall,
Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
E-mail: koneill@nature.berkeley.edu**

Paper prepared for presentation at the 2007 Amsterdam Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, May 24-26 2007

*****DRAFT: do not cite or circulate without author's permission*****

Abstract

There are several ways to examine and analyze the architecture of global environmental governance (GEG): to look at individual issue areas and regimes, or at the main organizations governing the global environment, or at the linkages and overlaps between international regimes. This paper takes a different perspective: it identifies and examines the “meta-regime” for global environmental governance. Taking the three main global environment-development conferences – Stockholm, Rio and Johannesburg – as markers, this paper examines how the norms, principles, rules and decision-making procedures recognized at Stockholm shaped governance outcomes, and defined the roles of different actors in global environmental governance.

Most importantly, this paper charts how this “meta-regime” has evolved in the 35 years since Stockholm, and identifies primary pressures for, and agents of, these changes. It charts a rapid and substantial shift in underlying norms of this meta-regime – from environmental protection to a norm of sustainable development based on inter and intra-generational equity to one based more on ensuring harmony between economic growth and environmental protection. The paper also demonstrates that basic rules and decision-making procedures of global environmental governance have actually been more resistant to change than underlying norms, despite growing demands for participation by environmental NGOs and private sector actors. The reliance on treaty construction and international environmental law ensured the continued dominance of international environmental policy by nation states – at least until recently. Recent adoption by UN agencies of many more hybrid, or consultative governance tools, reflect significant redefinition of actor roles in global environmental governance.

Understanding this underlying meta-regime accomplishes several key tasks. It provides a lens through which to examine changes in individual environmental regimes. It provides a narrative for understanding why global environmental governance has been contested. It provides a framework which encompasses not only instruments of international environmental diplomacy, but also the growing universe of private or hybrid initiatives in global environmental governance. And, it demonstrates the path-dependency of trends in global environmental governance.

Introduction: The Emergence of, and Key Debates in Global Environmental Governance

Ever since the late 1960s, global concern about the extent and intractability of global and transboundary environmental problems has driven efforts to create a durable and effective system – or architecture – of global environmental governance.

In an article published in 1970 in the influential policy journal, *Foreign Affairs*, George Kennan – renowned as one of the architects of the post World War Two world order – wrote about his vision of global environmental governance, then in its nascent stages (Kennan, 1970). Recognizing that “the entire ecology of the planet is not arranged in national compartments; and whoever interferes seriously with it anywhere is doing something that is almost invariably of serious concern to the international community at large”, he argues that the extant patchwork of national and international agencies were not up to the task of coordinating and managing the world’s environment. He goes on:

One can conceive, then, by an act of the imagination, of a small group of advanced nations, consisting of roughly the ten leading industrial nations of the world, including communist and non-communist ones alike...constituting themselves something in the nature of a club for the preservation of natural environment, and resolving, then, in that capacity, to bring into being an entity – let us call it initially an International Environment Agency... This entity, while naturally requiring the initiative of governments for its inception and their continued interest for its support, would have to be one in which the substantive decisions would be taken not on the basis of compromise among governmental representatives, but on the basis of collaboration among scholars, scientists, experts... true international servants, bound by no national or political mandate, by nothing, in fact, other than dedication to the work at hand.”

Kennan was writing with full knowledge of, and indeed in order to advise, the up-coming United Nations sponsored Conference on Humans and the Environment (UNCHE), to be held in Stockholm in 1972. At this point in time, the UN was looking to expand its role into managing global environmental problems. Through bringing together government representatives from 114 countries, it hoped to lay the groundwork for an architecture of global environmental governance that would serve the planet for decades to come.

Kennan's vision represents an almost purely technocratic version of global environmental governance: governance through impartial expertise rather than through the politics of conflict and compromise. What emerged, however, was far more political, and decentralized. Since 1972, global environmental governance has been associated with the negotiation and implementation by nation states of international (multilateral) environmental treaties and agreements on an issue-by-issue basis. These agreements have been for the most part coordinated by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the primary institution set up in Stockholm. In other words, the dominant driving force of global environmental governance since 1972 has been not technocracy, but diplomacy.

According to one analysis, more than 140 multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) have been created since 1920, over half of these since 1973 (Haas, 2001, p. 316). If one also counts treaty amendments, protocols, and other changes to existing agreements, this number could be far higher: "three or more governments have agreed on legally binding environmental commitments over 700 times"(Mitchell, 2003, pp. 434-435). Highlights include binding agreements over ozone layer depletion, the protection of biological diversity, the trade in hazardous wastes and the trade in endangered species. However, the most high-profile, and most criticized, negotiating process has been over climate change: the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which,

although it entered into force in 2005, has suffered from the active withdrawal of the US, and criticisms from the environmental community for being too weak to seriously address greenhouse gas emissions.

Flash forward to the early years of the 21st century, and we see that the predominant focus of the field of international environmental politics on inter-state diplomacy and international regimes challenged from a number of directions. First, some argue that this system has failed, and needs to be reformed or replaced. James Gustave Speth, former director of the World Resources Institute, and Dean of Yale University's School of Forestry and Natural Resources offers a representative view:

“[The] rates of environmental degradation that stirred the international community [a quarter century ago] continue essentially unabated today. The disturbing trends persist, and the problems have become deeper and truly urgent. The steps that governments took over the past two decades represent the first attempt at global environmental governance. It is an experiment that has largely failed” (Speth, 2004, pp. 1-2).

This perspective draws on the perceived weaknesses of existing treaty arrangements (Susskind, 1994), the intractability of disputes between Northern (rich) and Southern (poorer) countries, the “summit fatigue” that has resulted from the proliferation of international meetings around MEAs (VanDeveer, 2003), and the extent to which global economic regimes “trump” environmental concerns. The process set in train at Stockholm in 1972 has essentially stalled (Conca, 2005), and we need to find new ways to address these ever more critical problems at the global level. Suggested alternatives include the creation of some form of World Environment Organization (WEO), that would bring together the existing rather piecemeal set of global environmental agreements and initiatives under a stronger organizational roof (Biermann 2001, Newell, 2001,

Whalley and Zissimos, 2001, Najam, 2003). Some also suggest a devolution (or hybridization) of global environmental governance, which would accord a stronger role to non-state actors, such as the private sector, civil society organizations, operating both globally and locally, and which would rely more on the workings of the market and the provision of aid and technological assistance to achieve common environmental goals (e.g. Speth 2004).

Many of these alternatives already exist, and some argue that we are blinkered in our view of what constitutes global environmental governance. If we look beyond the standard IR repertoire of international cooperation and diplomacy, there are many different activities occurring around the world that also help constitute global environmental governance. (Conca, 2005, 2006; Wapner, 2003). By examining non-traditional actors – environmental activists, community groups, international organizations and even multinational corporations, non-traditional modes of governance, such as forest certification schemes, transnational advocacy networks, and actions across scales – from local to global – we see a picture of global governance that is far more multi-faceted, contentious, and potentially more democratic than the dominant model of international environmental diplomacy. This perspective challenges the dominant position of nation states as the primary agents of global governance – and argues that a more democratic vision of global governance may ultimately help us reach sustainability.

This paper takes a different approach to the study of global environmental governance. In it, I seek to demonstrate first, that it is possible to identify an overarching framework, or meta-regime of global environmental governance that has been in place since the 1972 Stockholm meeting. Second, and more importantly, I seek to demonstrate that this regime, rather than remaining static, has instead been relatively malleable in the face of pressures for change. However, some of its components have changed more slowly than others. In turn, the meta-

regime as it exists currently is far more complementary with “alternative” forms of global environmental governance than many believe – and that although it would take some engineering at this point to render this system more functional and effective than it currently is, we may be better off with reforming and opening the GEG meta-regime, rather than looking at ways to start over.

Studying the Architecture of Global Environmental Governance

The “architecture of global governance” is a rather grand term, but is a useful entry-point for understanding the big picture of global governance and how it works. It is, naturally, a very structural concept, and implies deliberate design, rather than chance evolution. The term is most frequently used to refer to the concrete organizations that anchor and implement global governance (not merely environmental governance), the sets of rules and institutions that structure interactions among key participants in global governance, normally states, but also “actor-networks” (Biermann, forthcoming). It is also used in discussions of planned or proposed reform of global governance systems and practices. Concrete organizational entities include the UN and its various agencies and other the secretariats and governing bodies of key international organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the IMF, or secretariats of individual treaty organizations. Rules and institutions may be as codified as the vast existing body of international law, as it is laid down in treaties and other legal instruments, or as “informal” as norms, or shared standards of acceptable behavior (including “soft” international law).¹ Others identify a separate “architecture” of international cooperation in the form of

¹ See also Saunier and Meganck, 2007, and Birnie and Boyle, 1992, chapters 1 and 2

“transgovernmentalism”: networks of domestic policy officials who interact directly with each other across national borders (Raustiala 2002, Slaughter 1997).

The dominant political science approach to the architecture of global environmental governance is through the study of the formation and effectiveness of international regimes as they have emerged in individual issue areas.² An early, and influential articulation by Stephen Krasner defines regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner, 1983, p. 2). Later definitions further emphasize actors’ and their roles, for example, defining regimes as “rules of the game agreed upon by actors in the international arena (usually nation states) and delimiting, for these actors, the range of legitimate or admissible behavior in a specified context of activity” (Rittberger, 1995, p. xii, cited in Conca 2006, p. XX).³

As conventionally understood, regimes develop within specific issue areas in international politics through cooperation - the intentional coordination of policies and adjustment of behaviors among nation states to address collective problems. In international environmental politics, we talk about the “climate regime”, the “ozone regime”, the “biodiversity regime”, and others. There is some disagreement about what actually constitutes a regime: most are anchored by a treaty, or multilateral environmental agreement. But some – such as the biodiversity regime – are commonly understood to comprise of a number of different, independent treaties or agreements. In other issue areas, there is some dispute as to whether a

² In the field of international environmental politics alone, there is a huge literature on the formation and/or effectiveness of international regimes. See, for theoretical introductions and overviews, Young, 1994, 1999, Haas et al, 1993, Mitchell, 2003, Chasek et al, 2006.

³ Other definitions – perhaps Young?

regime could be said to exist at all. Efforts to combat deforestation from the global level are a case in point: a treaty on forest governance due to be signed at the 1992 Rio Summit failed in late negotiation stages. For some, this means there is no regime around forests (Dimitrov, 2005). Others argue that the collection of “soft law” norms and quasi-governmental working groups and panels (and NGOs) that work in this area actually do constitute a regime (Gulbrandsen, 2004, Humphreys, 2003).

One approach that has moved beyond the study of individual regimes is the growing literature on regime linkages: the "politically significant connections between or among institutional arrangements" (Young, 1996, p. 2), including overlapping issue areas (e.g. biodiversity and climate change, hazardous waste trading and POPs), overlapping competencies (e.g. the various conventions associated with the biodiversity regime), and overlapping organizations or personnel (e.g. the Global Environment Facility links a number of regimes).⁴ This interest reflects the recognition of the growing density of international institutions (Raustiala and Victor, 2004). Understanding regime linkages, and possible conflicts, also captures important dimensions of effectiveness, dimensions that are missed by analyzing regimes solely as stand-alone institutions. In some cases, exploiting linkages may lead to synergistic gains; in others, ignoring potential conflicts or serious functional overlaps could significantly hamper how the regimes work (Rosendal, 2001). Most particularly, this literature reflects a realization of the growing maturity and continued evolution of international regimes as they become increasingly embedded as modes of global governance, and marks a considerable advance in the theory of international regimes.

⁴ See also Young, 2002; Selin and VanDeveer, 2003; Stokke, 2001; Oberthür and Gehring, 2006

Recently, the concept of global governance architecture has been addressed in debates over the overall effectiveness and direction of global environmental governance, including the debates referenced above. These debates contain both descriptive and normative elements: what does the architecture look like? Should it be engineered to work more effectively? Frank Biermann, in a recent article, defines the architecture of global governance as “the interlocking web of principles, institutions and practices that shape decisions by stakeholders at all levels” (Biermann, forthcoming, p. 7), and outlines dimensions of a search for an architecture that would enable, rather than constrain, effective “earth system governance”.⁵ For example, he envisions the creation of a World Environment Organization that would function more effectively to bring together the existing, piecemeal set of environmental regimes, and work to restrain over-zealous reliance by states on territorial sovereignty and national interests as a way to evade obligations to the global environment. Sanjeev Khagram, focusing more broadly on global governance as a whole, suggests a range of alternative models of possible future global governance architectures, including multilateralism, grassroots globalism, multiple regionalisms, world statism, networked governance, and institutional hierarchy (Khagram 2006, p. 98). He argues that we currently live in a world with a hybrid architecture of global governance – that elements of all these systems exist, often in conflict with one another: a world “disorder”, rather than a world order.

The Concept of a “Meta-Regime”

In this paper, I step away from a perspective that sees global environmental governance as a collectivity of individual regimes. Instead, I seek to identify a “meta-regime” that underlies

⁵ Earth system governance: the sum of the formal and informal rule systems and actor-networks at all levels of human society that are set up in order to influence the co-evolution of human and natural systems in a way that secures the sustainable development of human society” (Biermann forthcoming p. 4 – CHEK final version)

and anchors efforts by the community to govern the global environment. Further, this “meta-regime” not only plays a critical role in shaping global environmental governance. It is also itself shaped by this experience, and by pressures and challenges from actors and events internal and external to the meta-regime. Thus, it is a dynamic, rather than static model of the architecture of global governance, and it has in many ways proven surprisingly malleable in the face of pressures for change.

The key elements of the environmental meta regime mirror those identified by regime theorists: rules, norms and principles, decision-making procedures, and actor roles (and expectations). Following Krasner (1983) and Downie (2004, p. 64), I define rules as “specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action”, principles as “beliefs of fact, causation or rectitude”, norms as (mutually understood) standards of behavior, or, “shared expectations about appropriate behavior held by a community of actors” (Finnemore, 1996, p. 22), and decision-making procedures as practices for making and implementing collective choices or decisions. Rules in this case are the specific obligations that participants agree to take on to protect the environment, most often, the provisions of environmental conventions and protocols. Actor roles are the roles designated to, or taken on by, different participants and observers in the process of global environmental governance. Such actors include (but are not necessarily limited to) states, international organizations, environmental NGOs, corporate actors, and scientific (knowledge-based) groups.

This meta-regime is best seen as a guiding framework for a range of different environmental governance regimes and initiatives at the international level – in a sense, individual environmental regimes are nested in the meta-regime. While the UN was the main agent in setting it up, and plays a critical role in maintaining the regime, its subsequent evolution,

from its establishment in 1972 could not be said to be guided by design. In key ways, the environmental meta-regime differs from meta-regimes governing other issue areas in global governance: it has never been dominated by a superpower (e.g. US role in nuclear weapons control and other forms of collective security, trade and finance regimes), nor easily identified with a narrower range of widely-accepted norms (e.g. human rights). It is more diffuse than, say, the trade regime, governed as it is by the World Trade Organization as an over-arching legal framework. There are many different participants, often with widely different values, interests and expectations.

The following sections, in common with other works on governance architecture, first describe the emergence and evolution of the meta-regime, using the three main global environmental summits as markers. I then offer analysis of how the meta-regime has changed over time, and why – and some concluding prescriptions for strengthening it in ways that allow for less conflict than currently exists over how best to govern the global environment.

From Stockholm to Johannesburg: Identifying the Meta-Regime of Global Environmental Governance

The proliferation of international environmental diplomatic activity from the early 1970s onwards did not occur in a vacuum. Instead, it was very much guided by a set of overarching principles and goals set in place at the urging of the United Nations at the Stockholm conference in 1972, and open to adjustment and contestation ever since. Between 1972 and 2002, the UN sponsored three major international summits on environment and development: the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE), held in Stockholm, the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro, and the 2002 World

Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), held in Johannesburg.⁶ These so-called “mega-conferences” are designed to raise international awareness, set important environmental norms, principles and goals, and establish procedural frameworks in order to meet these goals (Seyfang, 2003; Haas, 2002). For our purposes, they provide important markers that help us judge the overall state of international environmental politics as it evolves over time (Najam, 2005), and an important context in which to situate overarching debates about global environmental governance.

Over this time period, several shifts are worth noting. First, the normative focus of the summits shifted from focusing primarily on environmental protection (“the human environment”) to sustainable development, conventionally defined in the 1987 Brundtland Report as development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987, p. 24). Sustainable development in practice means many things to different people, but its significance lies in the way it reflects the concerns of developing countries and economic interests, that economic growth and poverty alleviation not be sacrificed for environmental protection.

Second, non-state actor attendance and representation increased exponentially from Stockholm to Rio to Johannesburg. A mere 255 accredited NGOs attended Stockholm in 1972; by comparison, 1420 NGOs were accredited at Rio in 1992 (Brühl and Simonis, 2001, p. 21). In addition, another 17,000 representatives attended a parallel NGO forum (Clapp and Dauvergne 2005, p. 64). 8,000 civil society representatives attended the Johannesburg summit, again not counting those NGOs and others involved in parallel events (Clapp and Dauvergne, 2005, p. 68).

⁶ For discussion of UN “mega-conferences”, see Friedman et al, 2005, chapter 1

Third, by the 2002 Johannesburg Summit, considerable weariness had apparently set in over negotiating ambitious new agreements and institutional structures, compared with Rio in 1992, which saw the signing of the climate and biodiversity conventions, the publication of Agenda 21, a comprehensive action plan designed to guide global environment and development politics into the 21st century, and the creation of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (Wapner, 2003).

Thus, over the thirty year period from 1972 onwards, and beyond, several trends can be observed in the evolution of the meta-regime. First, of the components of the meta-regime, the underlying norms of the regime and the shape and extent of actor roles and expectations were most malleable to change. We see, for example, a shift in underlying norms from environmental protection to sustainable development, through to different understandings of sustainable development. Other norms and principles – for example, that of state sovereignty – have been rather less malleable, though some would argue that is changing. In terms of actor roles, these years mark two shifts: first, the rise of Southern countries as a vocal and influential participants in international environmental politics, and second, the rise of non-state actors, shifting from mere side-players to taking on significant roles in designing and implementing environmental governance initiatives. Yet, over this same time-frame, the basic decision-making procedures of the meta-regime – relying on the negotiation of international cooperative agreements – remained relatively unchanged, and until recently, fairly resistant to pressures for change.

Stockholm, 1972: The UN Conference on the Human Environment

Representatives from 114 countries attended the Stockholm meeting.⁷ While some have dismissed the Stockholm conference for being long on talk and short on action, it proved to be a pivotal moment in the evolution of international environmental politics. It set up goals and priorities for the international community, and a coordinated legal and political framework through which to meet them, with the UN as the agency in charge of coordinating this global effort (Sohn, 1973, Haas 2002).

First, in terms of global environmental goals and priorities, Stockholm helped place the environment squarely on the international political agenda, and made it part of the UN's official agenda. States agreed on a Declaration of Twenty-six (non-binding) Guiding Principles, and an Action Plan which set forth 109 recommendations for more specific international action (Sands and Peel, 2004, p. 47; available at www.unep.org). The Principles include the importance of environmental quality as a human right, the need to safeguard flora, fauna, air, land and water (and "especially representative samples of natural ecosystems"), and renewable and non-renewable resources from pollution and over-use (Principles 1-7).

Stockholm also marked the beginning of a debate over the relationship between environmental protection and economic development. Initially, lead negotiators had approached the problem of global environmental protection in purely environmental terms (hence the title of the meeting). However, Southern countries - beginning at this point in time to discover their collective voice in international politics (Najam, 2004) - injected a different note into this incipient debate, later to find full voice at the 1992 Rio conference: that environmental goals needed to be balanced with development goals, and that global environmental protection could not be achieved at the expense of inhibiting the ability of poorer nations to meet development

⁷ CHEK: North/South, East/West attendees

goals. These concerns were reflected in the Stockholm Declaration in calls for respecting the needs of developing countries, and for technical and financial assistance institutions.

Second, the countries meeting at Stockholm set up a set of procedures through which to meet collective environmental goals, integrating the existing body of international environmental laws and treaties. In addition to establishing the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the Stockholm Declaration called for multilateral cooperation, based on sound scientific knowledge, coordinated by international organizations, and governed by international law. Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration laid down what many consider its fundamental principle of international environmental law (Perrez, 1996). It reads:

States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.

Principle 21 thus attempts to draw a line between the jurisdictions of individual states, and that of the international community with respect to environmental problems. While its application has proven problematic when global environmental problems occur entirely within national borders, it left a wide scope for potential action with respect to global commons and transboundary environmental problems.

Therefore, the governance system established at Stockholm essentially ratified existing practices of international environmental diplomacy. It accorded the highest priority to the negotiation by states of multilateral treaties, on an issue by issue basis. Utilizing established channels of global governance would maximize participation by states, and grant the process

greater legitimacy in the eyes of national governments, the most important actors on the international stage, protecting and elevating as it did the principle of national sovereignty.

Rio de Janeiro, 1992: The UN Conference on Environment and Development

In 1989, the UN General Assembly called for a second “Earth Summit”, to be held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil from June 3-14 1992. Over the twenty years between Stockholm and Rio, the global environmental agenda had achieved considerable success, but was also facing a number of challenges (Gardner, 1992). On the positive side, the international community had negotiated a number of multilateral conventions, including the highly successful Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol, addressing the depletion of the ozone layer. UNEP had, despite budgetary challenges, and a lack of commitment from leading governments, followed through on research funding, public education programs and initiatives to build environmental policy capacity in developing countries. However, the international community had, by the late 1980s, realized that the Stockholm agenda had not fulfilled its early promise (Gardner, 1992, pp. 3-4). Along many critical dimensions, including deforestation and loss of biological diversity, the global environment was getting worse, not better, and the newly recognized problem of climate change was starting to loom large on the political agenda. Further, there was growing pressure from developing countries, NGOs and others to recognize the fundamental interconnectedness of environment and development goals, in particular that neither should be sacrificed in pursuit of the other. The publication in 1987 of *Our Common Future*, the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development headed by the former (and future) Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland (WCED, 1987), which defined sustainable development as the concept

that would link the two agendas, was immensely influential in shaping the agenda for the Rio Summit.

At the time, the Earth Summit, UNCED's informal title, was the largest UN conference ever organized. Over 100 heads of state attended, along with 8000 delegates from 178 countries, 9000 members of the press and 3,000 accredited NGO representatives (Gardner, 1992, p. 1). Like Stockholm, it also took place at a transitional moment in international affairs, following as it did the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union. The organizers sought to orchestrate ambitious outcomes, agreements that would reflect a truly global consensus, including major treaties on climate, biodiversity and deforestation, and a set of principles that would guide global environmental politics for decades to come. Indeed, on paper at least, that was what they achieved. The Rio Summit produced two major documents: the *Rio Declaration on Environment and Development*, 27 non-binding principles on sustainable development, and *Agenda 21*, a 400 page document designed to provide a blueprint for action at global, national and local levels across 115 programmatic areas.⁸ Also at Rio, two major conventions were opened for signature: the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Despite the failure to negotiate the third major planned treaty, on deforestation, attendees agreed upon a set of Forest Principles, for sustainable management of all types of forests. The UN's Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) was set up in December 1992 to follow through on Agenda 21 commitments.

At the same time as the official delegates met, the NGO community had organized a parallel summit, also in Rio, attended by no fewer than 18,000 NGOs (Friedman et al, 2005, p. 36). These parallel conferences reflect more than an effort to lobby the "official" representatives.

⁸ The Rio Declaration can be found at <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm>. The full text of Agenda 21 is available at <http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21toc.htm>

They explicitly set out to provide a separate forum for civil society representatives to meet, network and establish their own sets of agreed-upon goals and principles. Although some argue that the NGO “take” on Rio was too simplistic, simply parroting the positions of Southern governments, such as India and Malaysia (Gardner, 1992 p. 7), others argue that it marked a watershed of sorts in relations between Northern and Southern NGOs, with many Northern NGOs starting to listen and modify their positions in response to their Southern counterparts (Friedman et al, 2005, p. 58). With its packed schedule of meetings and social events, forums, newspapers and informal discussions, and its intense focus on influencing the inter-governmental process, as well as developing an alternative arena of global governance, the NGO summit laid the groundwork for future transnational networking, including the emergence of the World Social Forum.

The official summit was marked, however, by inter-governmental conflict. The US, once an enthusiastic supporter, became a reluctant participant, following interagency differences within the George H.W. Bush administration, ultimately refusing to sign the CBD (Gardner, 1992, p 8-14). The oil-producing countries argued successfully in favor of eliminating references to energy taxes and other such measures in the UNFCCC, while the Vatican, supported by several majority Roman Catholic countries, succeeded in eliminating references to contraception and population control measures in Agenda 21. The Summit had been billed as “the great shoot-out in the eco-coral” between North and South (Gardner, 1992, p. 7), and although it did not falter on North-South differences, little overall headway was made in bridging serious ideological gaps between rich and poor countries. Overall, however, the organizers felt that significant work had been achieved at Rio – but that the true test would be in how these achievements played out over time.

Johannesburg, 2002: The World Summit on Sustainable Development

The ten years between Rio and the third global environmental summit – the WSSD, held in Johannesburg in August 2002, did not, however, bear out the optimism voiced by some in 1992. Nonetheless, there had been some significant achievements in its wake, including the signing of new treaties on Persistent Organic Pollutants, a Biosafety protocol attached to the CBD and other important additions and amendments to existing regimes. Local Agenda 21 – a coalition of city and local governments designed to implement Agenda 21’s provisions at the local level – had generated significant activity, and the Global Environment Facility had been successfully restructured and expanded.

Still, several shadows loomed over preparations for the WSSD. Most visibly, the climate negotiations had apparently bogged down: the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, a hard-fought compromise to determine actual targets for greenhouse gas reductions, was moving only slowly towards implementation, and was opposed by the US on several grounds, including the lack of strict obligations for developing countries, and criticized by many for being too weak. The problems with the climate regime epitomized to many the larger problems with the large-scale multilateral framework for addressing global environmental problems, and the unwieldy nature of UN negotiation processes had engendered “summit fatigue” among many participants (VanDeveer, 2003).

In 1992, connections between trade liberalization and the environment were only just coming to the forefront. By 2002, these connections had evolved into sophisticated understandings and critiques of the interconnectedness of the environment, global poverty and inequality, and processes of neoliberal globalization, including international finance and trade.

For some, as talked about in previous chapters, these connections implied a fundamental critique of global capitalism, and underlay the transnational protests against the WTO, World Bank and so on. For others, they implied that global capitalism had to be harnessed in the interests of global sustainable development. The latter position was the one taken by global policy elites, from leading national governments to the UN to the WTO, and one of the leading themes of the WSSD was the importance of using trade and economic liberalization as a means towards achieving sustainable development (von Frantzius, 2004). The WSSD followed hard on the heels of the WTO's Doha Declaration, which laid out the WTO's social and development goals. In fact, part of the Plan of Implementation, the major document to emerge from Johannesburg more or less repeats the Doha Declaration's emphasis on the importance of eliminating trade barriers and subsidies as a means of achieving sustainable development (von Frantzius, 2004, p. 468)

Finally, while both the Stockholm and Rio conferences took place in the context of lessening international tensions (although with a good bit of uncertainty over the changing world order), the WSSD took place in the shadow of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York. This period was marked by growing tensions between the US and the Islamic world, and between the US and many of its UN counterparts over the looming war in Iraq. Both resources and attention had been directed away from problems of the global environment.

Johannesburg was quite possibly the largest global summit ever held – with over 100 heads of government, and close to 25,000 governmental, business and activist organizations in attendance (Wapner, 2003, p. 2). Still, its agenda by no means resembled the breadth and ambition of the agenda at Rio. No new treaties were signed, no new institutions established, and no sweeping declarations or action plans endorsed by the international community. Nonetheless,

its results reflect some interesting shifts in perspective on global environmental politics and policy.

First, the Plan of Implementation set out specific goals with respect to water and sanitation, health and hazardous chemicals, biodiversity, poverty alleviation and ozone-depleting substances. This marked the first time that water and sanitation targets had received this level of priority at a global environmental summit. However, participants failed to agree on including any measures regarding renewable energy or climate change (La Viña et al, 2003).

Second, the trade section of the Plan of Implementation recognized trade (and trade liberalization) as a means of implementing sustainable development, firmly allying the UN's environment and development agenda with WTO's Doha Round, and recognizing links between trade and environment governance at the global level.

Third, the WSSD endorsed the creation of "Type 2 partnerships" as a key policy tool. These partnerships – voluntary, non-binding partnerships between civil society, business and government actors, largely operating on a small scale on projects related to sustainability – represent a very different sort of global governance, far more decentralized and less governmental, compared with international treaty regimes, the dominant mode of global environmental governance to date (Andonova and Levy, 2003). Close to 300 of such partnerships were recognized immediately (von Frantzius, 2004).

Several non-official parallel processes accompanied the official summit, with the two main alternative meetings being the Global People's Forum and the Kimberley Summit of Indigenous Peoples (World Resources Institute, 2003, p. 140). Both generated their own declarations and programs of action, including a Civil Society Declaration issued alongside the principle declarations. Between the high number of developing and developed country NGOs

attending the official and parallel summits, and the diversity of interests represented, Johannesburg was certainly the most diverse of the global environmental summits (La Viña et al, 2003).

Many of these trends had been in existence for a while, with the WSSD serving primarily to bring them into sharp relief. Others note that these outcomes were certainly in line with expectations (LaViña et al, 2003; Speth, 2003). Overall, analyses of the WSSD share particular themes: first, “summit fatigue”, a “cacophony of voices”, a lack of central purpose, and second, growing focus on the private sector and international economic organizations, rather than governments, as the “agents” of sustainability, with barely a mention of the environmental and scientific concerns that motivated Stockholm and Rio (see Wapner 2003, VanDeveer 2003, von Frantzius 2004, Seyfang, 2003).

Wapner also notes a shift in the traditional positions of Northern and Southern countries towards global environmental protection (Wapner 2003, pp. 4-6). While at Stockholm and Rio, Southern governments were more likely to speak out in favor of sustainable development and Northern governments were seen as champions of environmental protection, at Johannesburg, their positions reversed. Southern representatives were far more likely to speak out in favor of environmental protection as “the grounding for economic well-being and development”, while many Northern governments instead firmly embraced economic development and globalization as the key to both poverty alleviation and environmental improvement (Wapner, 2003, pp. 5-6). Yet, Johannesburg was also the first “true sustainable development summit”, bringing together environmental, economic and civil society interests, although its outcomes demonstrate how much work has yet to be done to bridge the gaps between them (Speth, 2003).

Beyond Johannesburg

In a nutshell, the results of the Johannesburg summit reflected the growing dissatisfaction from parts of the global community about the pace and effectiveness of the treaty model of global environmental governance, and growing recognition that international environmental problems are linked both to collective action problems and conflicts of interest among nation states, and to the expansion and acceleration of economic globalization. Corporate interests, especially those interested in the “greening” of global business, were well represented at the WSSD. So were global civil society actors, empowered in recent years by the emergence of transnational contentious politics – in the form of protests at meetings of international economic institutions and in the form of networks of activists concerned about resource extraction and appropriation of common resources at the local level (such as water).

A straightforward history of the three main summits, and the major developments in international environmental law that link them, omits some important emerging “challenging” models of global environmental governance. Such an omission may make the declarations and plans of action emerging from the WSSD somewhat puzzling. The 1990s witnessed the emergence of two major new trends in framing and addressing environmental problems across national borders, each of which has challenged the dominant mode of global environmental governance through inter-state cooperation. At the same time, the meta-regime has stretched to encompass these interests, and, to some extent to date, their demands for alternate forms of global environmental governance.

First, the 1990s witnessed the emergence of “private” or hybrid regimes for the governance of particular transnational environmental issues, notably in the forestry sector, but also, to greater or lesser degrees of success, in other environmentally sensitive sectors, including

marine fisheries, certain areas of resource extraction (gold, diamonds), and particular commodities (e.g. coffee). These regimes brought together corporate actors and NGOs to create voluntary certification systems, using the power of market incentives and consumer education to generate sustainable production (Gulbrandsen, 1995). The most well-known of these regimes is the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), founded in 1993 by the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), working in conjunction with industry and community groups. The FSC allows firms that sign up to (and are certified as implementing) twelve principles of sustainable forest management to use an eco-label signaling their actions to purchasers (Cashore et al, 2004).

These regimes have garnered a lot of attention as an alternative to traditional intergovernmental forms of global governance. Advocates stress their more rapid decision-making processes, use of market mechanisms, and the involvement and participation of a wide range of stakeholders in deciding how to make industrial production more sustainable. Most significantly, they have demonstrated that the private sector has the potential to be an agent of environmentalism, not simply a subject of environmental regulation, and that environmental activist groups can work in partnership with industry, rather than always in opposition to it. Critics question the extent to which truly voluntary regimes can engage the worst offenders in industries where such offenders are rife. They also question the accountability of governance regimes established without the legitimacy conferred on national governments by international law and national elections. Still, the emergence and popularity of “multi-stakeholder” governance (also reflected in such hybrid global panels such as the World Commission on Dams) goes some way to explain the inclusion of private sector representatives at Johannesburg, and the endorsement of “Type II” partnerships, after the private sector had been conspicuous in its absence from other global environmental financial arrangements such as the GEF (Streck, 2001).

Second, and not entirely unrelated, the late 1990s saw the emergence of transnational civil society networks advocating a different framing of global environmental problems, and who used contentious methods of protest – at global and national levels – to get their message across. The rise of transnational advocacy and protest networks around issues as diverse as deforestation, dam development, trade liberalization and others has been well-documented elsewhere, and has been vastly facilitated by the growth of the internet and other tools of direct, easy transboundary communication (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Khagram et al, 2002, O’Neill 2004, O’Neill and VanDeveer, 2005). This alternate “framing” of global environmental problems (and the quest for sustainability) has a number of different dimensions, which help fill in some of the “gaps” of traditional intergovernmental regimes (Conca, 2006). It stresses the connections between global and local political processes, between globalization and environmental degradation, and between environmental degradation, the commodification of shared resources, and human rights (Conca 2005, Sachs, 2003, Cavanagh and Mander, 2002).

Ken Conca uses fresh water as an example of a global environmental issue (globally shared environmental issue?) that is not amenable to traditional forms of intergovernmental regulation, but has fostered the emergence of such networks (Conca 2006). A variety of water issues, including the building of large dams (often sponsored by the World Bank), and IMF-sponsored water privatization schemes as part of structural adjustment programs, even as overall, global access to clean drinking water has fallen, have galvanized civil society networks, and provided vivid examples of what happens when neoliberal economic principles are applied not wisely but too well. Other examples that fall under this framework include growing linkages between populations most vulnerable to climate change, such as the Arctic Inuit peoples and Pacific Islanders, and transnational movements seeking to prevent the appropriation of property

rights over indigenous (or local) resources and knowledge. Again, the normative force of these arguments helped put issues of access to drinking water, human health and others on the WSSD agenda – albeit still strongly linked to the neoliberal economic framework which civil society actors so strongly oppose.

Analysis: Change, Pressures for Change, and Conflict

Perhaps the primary utility of viewing global environmental governance through the perspective of a meta-regime, consisting of rules, decision-making procedures, norms and principles, and actor roles is that it provides a dynamic, macro-level perspective on an evolving governance architecture, which nests the various individual international environmental treaty regimes. Tracing out these shifts over time additionally helps us understand some of the focal points for conflicts in global environmental governance, some of the key ways they have or have not been resolved, and the framework that underpins (or could underpin) individual environmental governance efforts. Finally (and an angle not explored enough here, but I am working on it elsewhere with respect to the hazardous waste trade regime), it is possible to observe similar trends and changes within individual environmental regimes – as in Basel: more reliance on partnerships with non-state actors, a wider issue area scope (waste minimization), and attention paid to regime linkages.

To summarize the findings presented above, over the thirty plus years since the 1972 Stockholm Summit, some key changes can be observed across the components of the meta-regime. Some of these changes are in response to conflicts/disagreement over overarching norms or decision-making procedures. It might also be argued that the differential pace of change among the different regime components might themselves be causes of conflict or friction: that

norms and actor roles evolved more quickly than the rules and decision-making procedures of the meta-regime generated a good deal of frustration with the overall project of inter-state cooperation and the creation of treaty regimes.

*Underlying Environmental Norms:*⁹ have changed a fair bit – from environmental protection to sustainable development, although there is currently some tension between two conceptions of sustainable development. “SD 1” focuses on a more conventional interpretation of the original Brundtland Report, ensuring equitable inter- and intra-generational development, and was probably most in evidence at the 1992 Rio Summit. SD 2, a more recent incarnation, and very much in evidence in Johannesburg, is focused more on ensuring a balance between economic growth and efficiency on the one hand, and environmental protection/sustainability on the other – reflected, for example, in statements produced at Johannesburg on the relationship between trade liberalization and sustainability.¹⁰ Though not all relevant global norms have been as malleable – state sovereignty, for instance, if it could be considered a norm.

Actor Roles: An important component of international regimes, albeit one that is often overlooked in more conventional definitions, is how regimes allocate and structure the roles (and expectations) of regime actors (or participants). As we have observed, there are many different types of actors engaged in global environmental governance. The early years of the meta-regime allocated central decision-making roles to governments, and their representatives, with UN agencies playing the major role in coordinating international negotiations, and treaty implementation. One “actor role” (or relationship) that began to change pretty quickly was the

⁹ Having problems with the “principles” component – assuming this generally refers to understandings of cause and effect with respect to the problem, I could look at how issues of local knowledge are being incorporated across various individual regimes?

¹⁰ See also Steven Bernstein’s work on the “compromise of liberal environmentalism” (Bernstein, 2000, 2002).

role of the global South, whose representatives became vocal participants in global environmental governance early on (Najam 2005). Over time, we have also observed exponential growth in the number of non-state actors – both non-state and corporate sector – attending environmental meetings, and most particularly, the summits, despite their “official” relegation to the sidelines. More recently, it seems that non-state actor roles are changing. Certainly, NGOs have long played important roles in helping implement environmental regimes and monitor state compliance, but now it seems that non-state actors are being more formally incorporated into the governance process, as influential players in their own right, as basic rules and decision-making procedures have finally begun to change.

Rules and Decision-making Procedures: have been far less malleable. With states remaining central actors in global environmental governance, less progress has been made in moving beyond the negotiation and implementation by the entire community of states (at least, those who choose to participate) of separate, issue-based environmental treaties and agreements. However, some changes can be observed. For example, the general substance of environmental treaties has moved away from regulatory agreements – for example, those built around trade restrictions (e.g. Basel Convention, CITES) towards the use of market-based mechanisms (e.g. Kyoto Protocol, and see Conca 2000). Also, there is growing evidence that regime secretariats and associated organizations are looking into ways of managing regime overlap and linkages, in ways that generate overall benefits, rather than conflict (Jinnah, forthcoming). Finally, by Johannesburg, and perhaps also through the activities of the GEF, it was clear that the UN and other organizing bodies were keen on establishing models of governance around multi-stakeholder participation frameworks (e.g. World Commission on Dams, Type II partnerships).

These changes have occurred in response to a variety of pressures, both internal and external to the meta-regime. Internal pressures include the ways in which the South (as represented by G77) have articulated different views of what environmental regimes should look like, and the impacts they should have (e.g. sustainable development, common but differentiated responsibility), and also a general dissatisfaction from regime participants as to how well the treaty approach works. This is especially the case, given the amount of effort expended in negotiating processes – the “summit fatigue” detailed by many observers (e.g. VanDeveer, 2003).

This dissatisfaction is also a major driver for actors peripheral to this process, both to try to get more involved in treaty negotiation, and also to develop alternatives to the traditional model. Beyond the framework of the meta-regime, other, more experimental versions of global environmental governance have emerged – especially private governance regimes. Because of the shifts identified here, it is possible to argue that these are becoming more, not less, compatible with the way the meta-regime looks now (an important point!).

Another set of external pressures emanates from the international economic order, which grew a good deal in scope over the 1972-2002 timeframe, notably with the creation of the WTO in 1995. Increasingly, the global economic and environmental governance orders have had to deal with each other: do their specific rules and goals conflict? Can they work together? Ideologically, it is possible to argue that the environmental meta-regime has drifted more towards the ideas and norms underlying global economic liberalization (and see Bernstein, 2002, 2000). In turn, this process is generating a good deal of contestation, primarily from the grassroots groups and from transnational activist networks (and may be the big upcoming battle

over GEG in coming years, in unexpected arenas – e.g. biotechnology and intellectual property rights, water, health and toxics).

Prescriptions and Applications

To return to the discussion at the outset of this paper, some currently depict the state of global environmental governance as one of conflict between different ideas of how such governance can be done most effectively (e.g. Speth). Many ideas have been put forward as to how to reform global environmental governance. My argument is that it's not at all clear that we need to look at different options as alternatives: rather, it seems that the meta-regime of global environmental governance has been quite responsive to pressures for change, and, I would argue that the "alternate" forms of GEG identified in this paper are quite compatible with the underlying norms and the newer actor roles that have emerged within the meta-regime framework. In turn, I would argue that these new initiatives, diverse as they are (and, with respect to the private regimes, perhaps somewhat problematic in terms of their authority/legitimacy), need anchoring in an overarching framework, and here is one, ready-made. In some ways, this argument is echoed in recent relative literature (e.g. Cashore and Bernstein, 2004, 2006 – that the FSC and similar non-state market driven governance initiatives are becoming more "international regime"-like, for example, in incorporating more soft law type mechanisms; Vogler, 2005: that alternatives to MEAs don't offer the same legitimacy, capabilities of state-led global governance, and therefore need that backing; Conca, 2006: that we need to expand the definition of "regime" to encompass governance emerging in issue areas like water, less amenable to international cooperation).

However, I would also argue, given the “stickiness” of certain meta-regime components, a little deliberate engineering is in order (to go back to the earlier discussion of governance architecture). What form this would take is an open question: do we need looser GEG? Less emphasis on convergence of rules and decision-making procedures, but a recognition of their existence and complementarities? Or do we need the “formalization” of a World Environment Organization? In particular, this discussion would suggest that we need a WEO that really can take a variety of governance perspectives and participants into account? Either way, this dynamic perspective on global environmental governance, as a governance arena characterized more by change in its underlying components (and pressures for change), rather than stability, is highly informative as we ponder these alternatives. Certainly, there’s no point in wiping the GEG slate clean and starting over. These various debates over the future architecture of global environmental governance, and how it can and should encompass different perspectives will be entirely to the fore as governments, international organizations and other interested parties begin to negotiate the successor agreement to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on climate change, which expires in 2012.

Finally, I point to a potential source of conflict at the meta-regime level. Despite the growth in grassroots transnational networks in recent years, global environmental governance is almost entirely carried out by global elites – be they state actors, international bureaucrats, corporate representatives, or professional NGOs. Efforts to really connect global environmental governance to the local level (so that communication and learning works effectively both ways) tend to be more token than real. One conflict (possibly to be carried out in US or international courts) on the horizon results from the failure to date on the part of the international community to help relocate or compensate those communities – Arctic Inuit and Pacific Islanders – whose

lives and cultures are most immediately threatened by rising sea levels as a result of climate change. Certainly we are likely to see continued “smaller” conflicts of this sort, but they also point to a larger problem. Questions of legitimacy and representation are coming to the fore as global governance expands into the every day lives of many people (Zürn, 2004): the WTO is already trying to face these issues, and how the meta-regime of global environmental governance addresses these challenges as they arise will be fundamental to its future success.

References

- Andonova, Liliana B., and Marc A. Levy. "Franchising Global Governance: Making Sense of the Johannesburg Type II Partnerships." *Yearbook of International Cooperation on Environment and Development 2003/04*. Eds. Olav Schram Stokke and Øystein B. Thommessen. London: Earthscan, 2004.
- Bernstein, Steven. "Ideas, Social Structure and the Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism." *European Journal of International Relations* 6.4 (2000): 464-512.
- . *The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.
- Bernstein, Steven, and Benjamin Cashore. "Nonstate Global Governance: Is Forest Certification a Legitimate Alternative to a Global Forest Convention?" *Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environment and Social Governance*. Eds. John J. Kirton and Michael J. Trebilcock. London: Ashgate publishing Company, 2004.
- Bernstein, Steven, and Benjamin Cashore. "Can Non-State Governance Be Legitimate? A Theoretical Framework." *Joint IDDRA, CIRAD and Sciences-Po Research Unit Conference*. Montpellier, France, 2006.
- Biermann, Frank. "The Emerging Debate on the Need for a World Environment Organization: A Commentary." *Global Environmental Politics* 1.1 (2001): 45-55.
- Biermann, Frank. "'Earth System Governance' as a Crosscutting Theme of Global Change Research." *Global Environmental Change* (Forthcoming).
- Birnie, Patricia W., and Alan E. Boyle. *International Law and the Environment*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Brühl, Tanja, and Udo E. Simonis. "World Ecology and Global Environmental Governance." *Working Paper II 01-402, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (Science Center Berlin)* (2001).
- Cashore, Benjamin, Graeme Auld, and Deanna Newsom. *Governing through Markets: Forest Certification and the Emergence of Non-State Authority*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.
- Cavanagh, John, and Jerry Mander, eds. *Alternatives to Economic Globalization: A Better World Is Possible; a Report of the International Forum on Globalization*. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2002.
- Chasek, Pamela S., David L. Downie, and Janet Welsh Brown. *Global Environmental Politics, Fourth Edition*. Boulder: Westview Press, 2006.
- Clapp, Jennifer, and Peter Dauvergne. *Paths to a Green World: The Political Economy of the Global Environment*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005.
- Conca, Ken. "The WTO and the Undermining of Global Environmental Governance." *Review of International Political Economy* 7.3 (2000): 484-494.
- . "Environmental Governance after Johannesburg: From Stalled Legalization to Environmental Human Rights?" *Journal of International Law & International Relations* 1.1-2 (2005): 121-138.

- . *Governing Water: Contentious Transnational Politics and Global Institution Building*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006.
- Dimitrov, Radislav S. *Science and International Environmental Policy: Regimes and Nonregimes in Global Governance*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.
- Downie, David Leonard. "Global Environmental Policy: Governing through Regimes." *The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy*. Eds. Regina S. Axelrod, David Leonard Downie and Norman J. Vig. Washington: CQ Press, 2004.
- Finnemore, Martha. *National Interests in International Society*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.
- Friedman, Elizabeth J., Kathryn Hochstetler, and Ann Marie Clark. *Sovereignty, Democracy, and Global Civil Society*. Albany: SUNY Press, 2005.
- Gardner, Richard N. *Negotiating Survival: Four Priorities after Rio*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992.
- Gulbrandsen, Lars H. "Overlapping Public and Private Governance: Can Forest Certification Fill the Gaps in the Global Forest Regime?" *Global Environmental Politics* 4.2 (2004): 75-99.
- Gulbrandsen, Lars H. "Mark of Sustainability? Challenges for Fishery and Forestry Eco-Labeling." *Environment* 47.5 (2005): 8-23.
- Haas, Peter M., Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy, eds. *Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection*. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1993.
- Haas, Peter M. "Environment: Pollution." *Managing Global Issues: Lessons Learned*. Eds. P.J. Simmons and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001.
- Haas, Peter M. "UN Conferences and Constructivist Governance of the Environment." *Global Governance* 8.1 (2002).
- Humphreys, David. "Life Protective or Carcinogenic Challenge? Global Forests Governance under Advanced Capitalism." *Global Environmental Politics* 3.2 (2003): 40-55.
- Jinnah, Sikina, *Managing Overlapping Regimes: Authority, Autonomy and Agency in International Bureaucracies* (working title), Ph.D. dissertation, UC Berkeley (forthcoming)
- Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- Kennan, George F. "To Prevent a World Wasteland: A Proposal." *Foreign Affairs* (1970).
- Khagram, Sanjeev. "Possible Future Architectures of Global Governance: A Transnational Perspective/Prospective." *Global Governance* 12 (2006): 97-117.
- Khagram, Sanjeev, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. *Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002.
- Krasner, Stephen D., ed. *International Regimes*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- La Viña, Antonio G. M., Gretchen Hoff, and Anne Marie DeRose. "The Outcomes of Johannesburg: Assessing the World Summit on Sustainable Development." *SAIS Review* 23.1 (2003): 53-70.
- Mitchell, Ronald B. "International Environmental Agreements: A Survey of Their Features, Formation and Effects." *Annual Review of Environment and Resources* 28 (2003): 429-461.
- Najam, Adil. "The Case against a New International Environmental Organization." *Global Governance* 9 (2003): 367-384.
- Najam, Adil. "The View from the South: Developing Countries in Global Environmental Politics." *The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy*. Eds. Regina S. Axelrod, David Leonard Downie and Norman J. Vig. Washington: CQ Press, 2004.
- Najam, Adil. "Developing Countries and Global Environmental Governance: From Contestation to Participation to Engagement." *International Environmental Agreements* 5 (2005): 303-21.
- Newell, Peter. "New Environmental Architecture and the Search for Effectiveness." *Global Environmental Politics* 1.1 (2001): 35-44.
- Oberthür, Sebastian, and Thomas Gehring. "Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance: The Case of the Cartagena Protocol and the World Trade Organization." *Global Environmental Politics* 6.2 (2006): 1-31.
- O'Neill, Kate. "Transnational Protest: States, Circuses, and Conflict at the Frontline of Global Politics."

- International Studies Review* 6 (2004): 233-251.
- O'Neill, Kate, and Stacy VanDeveer. "Transnational Environmental Activism after Seattle: Between Emancipation and Arrogance." *Charting Transnational Democracy: Beyond Global Arrogance*. Eds. Janie Leatherman and Julie A. Webber. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005.
- Perrez, Franz Xaver. "The Relationship between 'Permanent Sovereignty', and the Obligation Not to Cause Transboundary Environmental Damage." *Environmental Law* 26.4 (1996): 1187-212.
- Raustiala, Kal. "The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law." *Virginia Journal of International Law* 43 (2002): 1-92.
- Raustiala, Kal, and David G. Victor. "The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources." *International Organization* 58.2 (2004): 277-309.
- Rittberger, Volker, ed. *Regime Theory and International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Rosendal, G. Kristin. "Overlapping International Regimes: The Case of the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF) between Climate Change and Biodiversity." *International Environmental Agreements* 1 (2001): 447-468.
- Sachs, Wolfgang. "Environment and Human Rights." *Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy* (2003).
- Sands, Philippe, and Jacqueline Peel. "Environmental Protection in the 21st Century: Sustainable Development and International Law." *The Global Environment: Institutions, Law, Policy*. Eds. Regina S. Axelrod, David Leonard Downie and Norman J. Vig. Washington DC: CQ Press, 2004.
- Saunier, Richard E., and Richard A. Meganck. *Dictionary and Introduction to Global Environmental Governance*. London: Earthscan, 2007.
- Selin, Henrik, and Stacy D. VanDeveer. "Mapping Institutional Linkages in European Air Pollution Politics." *Global Environmental Politics* 3.3 (2003): 14-46.
- Seyfang, Gill. "Environmental Mega-Conferences: From Stockholm to Johannesburg and Beyond." *Global Environmental Change* 13 (2003): 223-28.
- Slaughter, Anne-Marie. "The Real New World Order." *Foreign Affairs* 76 (1997): 183-.
- Sohn, Louis B. "The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment." *Harvard International Law Journal* 14 (1973): 423-515.
- Speth, James Gustave. "Perspectives on the Johannesburg Summit." *Environment* 45.1 (2003): 24-30.
- Speth, James Gustave. *Red Sky at Morning: America and the Crisis of the Global Environment*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.
- Stokke, Olav Schram. "The Interplay of International Regimes: Putting Effectiveness Theory to Work." *Fridtjof Nansen Institute Report* 14 (2001).
- Streck, Charlotte. "The Global Environment Facility - a Role Model for International Governance?" *Global Environmental Politics* 1.2 (2001): 71-94.
- Susskind, Lawrence E. *Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global Environmental Agreements*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- VanDeveer, Stacy. "Green Fatigue." *Wilson Quarterly* (2003): 55-59.
- Vogler, John. "In Defense of International Environmental Cooperation." *The State and the Global Ecological Crisis*. Eds. John Barry and Robyn Eckersley. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005.
- von Frantzius, Ina. "World Summit on Sustainable Development Johannesburg 2002: A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Outcomes." *Environmental Politics* 13.2 (2004): 467-73.
- Wapner, Paul. "World Summit on Sustainable Development: Toward a Post-Jo'burg Environmentalism." *Global Environmental Politics* 3.1 (2003): 1-10.
- Whalley, John, and Ben Zissimos. "What Could a World Environmental Organization Do?" *Global Environmental Politics* 1.1 (2001): 29-34.
- World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). *Our Common Future*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- World Resources Institute. *World Resources 2002-2004: Decisions for the Earth - Balance, Voice and Power*. Washington: World Resources Institute, 2003.
- Young, Oran R. *International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society*. Ithaca: Cornell

- University Press, 1994.
- , ed. *The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999.
- Young, Oran R. "Institutional Linkages in International Society: Polar Perspectives." *Global Governance* 2.1 (1996): 1-24.
- Young, Oran R. *The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change: Fit, Interplay and Scale*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002.
- Zürn, Michael. "Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems." *Government and Opposition* 39.2 (2004): 260-287.