Conceptualizing climate change governance beyond the international regime

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Abstract: This paper seeks to develop a conceptual framework that can serve to analyze the governance of climate change beyond the international regime. To this end, two theoretical approaches are integrated: the neo-Gramscian approach and the governmentality perspective. The paper combines insights from these two perspectives in order to generate alternative and deeper understandings of the: (i) nature of the state; (ii) character of power and authority in the international arena; (ii) basis of the increasing involvement of non-state actors (NSAs) in global governance; and (iv) the relationship between state and NSAs. The paper does not make any claim to the possibility of unifying the two theoretical perspectives. Rather, it is posited that, in combination, they offer a superior understanding of the changing order in relation to international climate governance in particular and the notion of global governance in general.

1. Introduction

The vast majority of research concerning the governance of climate change has focused on the development of the international climate change regime, its constituent agreements, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, and their implementation ((Paterson and Grubb 1992; Bodansky 1993; 2001; Grubb 1995; Rowlands 1995; Paterson 1996; Grubb and Yamin 2001; Andresen and Shardul Agrawala 2002; Dessai and Schiper 2003; Biermann 2005; Vogler; 2005; Sterk and Wittneben 2006). This focus on the state-centric regime approach as the means of analyzing global climate co-operation is directly related to the prevalence of a number of paradigmatic assumptions

about the nature of international relations, including the form and functions of the state, the nature and location of power and authority and the conception of agency and legitimacy in the international arena.

However, over the past five years, there has been an explosion of parallel initiatives, at a variety of scales, by non-state actors, seeking to reduce emissions of green house gases – in cities, at the regional level, through corporations, voluntary offset schemes and so on – which have significant implications for climate change governance.[1] First, such initiatives may have a material impact on the success or otherwise of the international regime as they offer the means through which international goals might be achieved. Second, such initiatives may achieve reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases independently of the success or otherwise of the current regime and post-2012 architectures for governing climate change.[2] Third, through seeking to govern climate change in their own right such initiatives fundamentally alter how we conceptualize and understand the nature of global climate politics. Indeed, the efforts to grapple with the unique and diverse challenges presented by human-induced variations in the global climate, and in particular the role of NSAs in this process, resurrect critical questions about agency, authority and structure which would seem to pose insuperable challenges to the basic assumptions of the regime analytical research agenda.[3]

In response to this phenomenon, a body of work on global governance has emerged. Although not all the literature on global governance is presented as a counterpoint to the state-centered regime approach, it is nonetheless fair to suggest that the bourgeoning scholarship on

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[1] For detailed accounts of the roles of various non-state actors in governing climate change, see, among many others; Newell (2000), Auer (2000), Betsill and Corell (2001), Fogel (2003), Betsill and Bulkeley (2004; 2006), Gulbrandsen and Andresen (2004).

[2] These are empirical questions that we intend to address through this project.

[3] It is important to note that the involvement of non-state actors in world politics is by no means a new phenomenon. In this regard, one need only think of the roles of the church, the transnational antislavery movements (between 1833 and 1865) and in more contemporary times, international agencies like the Red Cross in shaping world politics (see Collingwood 2006:439-443). In conceptual terms, the activities of these and similar actors provided much of the inspiration for theories on pluralism, globalism and interdependence that flourished within international relations (IR) in the early 1960s and 1970s (see Snyder et al. 1962; Rosenua [1966] 1980; Jervis 1976). However, the claim is that in the last two decades or so, we have witnessed something distinctive about the involvement of non-state actors in world politics. For detailed account of this distinction, see (Edwards and Hulme 1995; Collingwood 2006).

governance generally stem from the recognition of the need to provide accounts for the changes in the global order with respect to the increasing visibility and influence of NSAs in steering international policies (Rosenua 1997; 1999; 2000; Wapner 1997; Newell 2000; Risse 2002; Jagers and Stripple 2003; Leonard 2006; Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006) . But while the global governance literature excels in highlighting the role of NSAs in climate change governance, it provides few if any of the analytical tools required to interpret or conceptualize this phenomenon. For, to pass as an alternative analytical perspective, it is not sufficient to simply hint at the proliferation and rising influence of these non-state actors. Rather, a coherent account of the basis of the phenomenon and a qualitative explanation of its characteristics, direction and impact are needed.

As efforts to negotiate a post 2012 climate agreement get under way, and especially given the expectations that NSAs could play a critical role in this process, and indeed in the on-going efforts to mitigate and/or adapt to the effects of climate change, there is an urgent need to address the theoretical challenges associated with the changing global order. A better understanding of the form and functions of the state, the nature and location of authority, the basis of NSAs involvement and their relationship with the state, as well as how they actually get things done, would prove invaluable in assigning responsibilities, coordinating efforts, and in promoting equity, accountability and qualitative participation in the global management of climate change. Such insights are also crucial for mapping research, and in advancing or weighing different proposals for the engagement of NSAs in both present and future environmental regimes.

In a bid to address some of the current confusions around the issues of power, agency and structure associated with the proliferation and rising influence of NSAs in global climate governance in particular, and international environmental co-operation in general, this paper presents an alternative approach that involves the combination of insights from neo-Gramscian perspectives to international co-operation and governmentality theories.[4] We posit that a combination of these

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[4] There have been previous attempts to use these theories independently to explain global environmental governance. But these accounts despite yielding very fruitful insights offer limited kit for a comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon. For some example of these endeavours, see sections 4 and 5.

theoretical perspectives provides a most compelling framework for understanding: (a) the nature of the state and of power and authority, in the international arena; (b) the basis of the increasing visibility of NSAs in climate change governance; and (c) the nature of the relationship between these new group of actors and traditional sovereign authorities. Addressing these issues, in turn, serves to open up the space for critical reflections on the limits and capabilities of non-state actors, on the *hows* and effectiveness of governance by these actors, and on what could be their appropriate roles in the search for effective, efficient and equitable future global climate regime.

We start with a brief treatment of the regime theory which is arguably the most established approach for understating global environmental governance. The regime approach has a fairly neat but very limited conception of power, motivation and agency. This limitation stems from the fact that the regime approach is predominantly state-centric and thus does not therefore provide much space for the conceptual analysis of the involvement of NSAs. Section 3 looks at the concept of global environmental governance as a theoretical perspective. It considers the extent to which this perspective serves as a corrective to the regime approach as well as its limitations in conceptualizing global climate governance. Having considered the strengths and weakness of the two main existing approaches for analyzing climate change governance, we present an account, first, in Section 4 of the neo-Gramscian perspective and then, in Section 5, of the governmentality approach indicating how aspects of these theoretical perspectives provide insights into the conceptual issues surrounding the involvement of actors above and blew the level of state in steering international climate policy. In Section 6 we examine how the combination of the two approaches could lead to a deeper and more robust conceptualization of global climate governance. We conclude by considering the implications of these understandings for future research.

2. Regime theory and non-state actors in global climate governance

Much of the early effort to interpret international climate co-operation proceeded from the basis of the regime approach (Young 1989; Rowlands 1992; Willets 1993; Paterson 1996a, 1996b;

Ward 1996; Saurin 1996).[5] This is not surprising because, until very recently, the regime analytical approach was the dominant theoretical lens for the study of international rule-based co-operation (Keohane and Nye 1977; Young 1980; Krasner ed. 1983; Keohane 1984; Haggard and Simmons 1987; Hasenclever et al. 1997). Besides, as Newell (2000:23-24) points out, regime theory was particularly attractive since it 'responds to a number of overlapping concerns' that traditionally characterize the global environmental problematic. These include the desire to regulate states' behaviour in order avoid the "tragedy of commons", the need to control tendencies towards "free-riding", and the need to respond to the distributive questions arising from the collective response to global environmental challenges. However, notwithstanding the appeals of this perspective, it does not, as we show below, suffice as a way of conceptualizing the increased profile of non-state actors in the global governance of climate change.

2.1 Key ideas and concepts in regime theory

Regime theory can be defined as the system of thought devoted to explaining the mechanisms and procedures through which nation states in the absence of a world government or supranational authority seek to regularize behaviour in a given issue-area in international relations.[6] Basically, the regime research agenda emerged as a counterpoint to the zero-sum "realist" approaches of the international system in which international politics is characterized solely in terms of the contest for relative gains by state actors operating in an essentially anarchical international environment (Krasner 1983a: vii; Keohane 1984; Vogler 2000: 21-22).

In contrast to the "realist" perspective, the regime literature emphasized the prevalence of inter-state co-operative institutions and indeed the tendencies of states to regulate their practices in a

[5] It is fair to say that some, if not most of these authors did express at one point or the other the sentiment that the dominant international regime approach proves inadequate as a means of capturing the politics of climate change (see for example Paterson 1995: 265).

[6] A popular definition of regimes is offered by Krasner (1983:3): regimes are sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors' expectation converge in a given issue area of international relations.

fairly well co-coordinated manner in order to solve collective action problems or simply to maintain

order and stability in the international system (Keohane and Nye 1977; Young 1980; 1989; Krasner

1983b; Keohane 1984; Vogler 2000). It is crucial to point out that the development of regime

thought witnessed important differences in emphasis and understandings of the process through

which regimes are created, the factors that are important and the extent to which regimes matter.[7]

For instance, power-based theories posit that regimes are created by the hegemon, that is, the state

that commands the most (economic and military) power either to further its specific interest or

simply to promote international management in other to forestall conflict (Waltz 1979; Snidal 1985;

Gilpin 1987; Grieco 1988a; 1988b; 1993). Accordingly, power is seen as the most important factor in

the creation and maintenance of regimes such that international institutions on their own, that is, as

independent variables, do not mater much. Instead, the crucial factor is said to be the motivation

and disposition of the hegemon or the power configuration prevalent in the international system.

Utility-based approaches, on the other hand, emphasize interest as the main causal factor in the

formation of regimes (Keohane 1984; Young 1989; 1994; 1998). Functionalists hold that regimes are

formed when state actors perceive that individual actions with respect to a given issue-area will not

promote their interests in the long run. Regimes, here, are seen as the medium used by state actors

to reduce vulnerability, opportunism and uncertainty while stabilizing the expectations needed to

promote collective action.[8] A third strand is the constructivist approach where emphasis is placed on

consensual knowledge as the key causal factor in the formation of regimes (Haas 1975; Kratochwil

and Ruggie 1986; Haas 1989; 1992; Onuf 1989; Litfin 1994). In this view, a regime will be formed

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[7] The term "regime theory" is strictly speaking a misnomer. Although the terminology "regime theory" is widely used, perhaps even overworked in discussions on international co-operation, one can say that there is, in real terms, nothing like regime theory but rather that what we have is different 'theories about regimes' (Vogler 2000: 23). Such an answer would be informed by the fact that whilst a consensus definition is generally admitted to exist:
there has always been fierce debate over: the meaning of the key phrases; the manner in which regimes arise and are sustained; whether regimes matter at all; and even the usefulness of the concept as an analytical tool in the study of world politics (see Keohane and Nye 1977; Young 1982; Krasner ed. 1983; Haggard and Simons 1987; Kratochwil 1989; Keohane 1989; Hasenclever et al. 1997; Vogler 2000).7 It is in recognition of the significance of these controversies that scholars now tend to talk, not of regime theory, but of 'a plethora of contending theories to explain regime creation maintenance and transformation' (Haggard and Simons 1987: 429) and of 'various schools of thought within the study of international regimes' (Hasenclever et al., 1996:178).
[8] Expectation here is used in terms of the demand for reciprocity and obedience to rules and of the establishment of long-term behavior patterns by states.

mainly when there is common knowledge or understanding on the nature of the issue and what needs to be done to achieve solution.

Despite these differences, however, there are still a few connecting ideas that enables one to speak in terms of "regime theory". At least three are very important with respect to the focus of this paper. The first is that regimes are generally seen as a medium through which state actors solve problems or respond to challenges that are *international* in nature. The critical assumption implied here is that it is easy to differentiate between issues that are national and the ones that are international in scope (Paterson 1995:215 1996a: 63). This assumption relates to the basic paradigmatic conception about the nature of the state and its spatio-temporal characteristics in mainstream international relations literature. The second is that regime theory assumes self-interest as the basic motivation of states in the formation and maintenance of international institutions (Keohane 1984; cf. Hasenclever et al. 1997:27; Newell 2000:27; Vogler 2003:25). This assumption holds for the three strands of regime theory described above even though there are variations in the ways interest is conceptualized.[9] The third and perhaps the most important uniting factor is that the regime approach is essentially a state-centered theory. The approach, as Newell (2000:23) puts, it 'takes as given the preeminent status of the nation-states as the key point of reference in seeking account for the ways issued unfold in the global agenda'. Critically, there is little or no space for the account of the involvement of non-actors in international institutions building. To the extent that the importance of non-state actors is acknowledged it is usually in terms of their roles in influencing state actors (Auer 2000).

Furthermore, and in part as a result of these three assumptions, under the regime approach states are conceived as homogenous unitary actors with well-defined orders of preference. In

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[9] For "realists", the interests states seek to achieve are considered relative, meaning that states seek to maximise their power and wealth in comparison with other state actors. For neoliberal institutionalists, the interest states seek to maximize is absolute. This implies that states are considered as egoists interested in seeking their own interest independent of what others may lose or gain in the process. Constructivists agree that interest is the key issue in regime formation, but they argue that the ways interests are computed are far more complex and in particular heavily dependent on the depth of knowledge or extent of information available to states (cf. Hasenclever et al. 1997:27; Bernstein 2001:20).

conceptualizing states as "black boxes" (Stokke 1997:29), the regime approach critically ignores the significance of internal politics including the diverse motivations and interests that are mixed up in this process (Newell 2000; Paterson et al. 2003). The reason for this may be that under the regime approach, power is basically conceived as 'territorially bounded' and 'equated with the nation state' (Betsill and Bulkeley 2006:146). Moreover, in this view, a zero-sum notion of power is assumed. Accordingly, once the central sate is identified as the location of authority, it is impossible to ascribe non-state actors with the power or legitimacy in the international arena. Given that the nation-state has the monopoly of power, and that all other sub-national actors act merely within the purview of the state and or in a bid to influence it, regime theory attempts to account for the outcome of international co-operative effort by focusing exclusively on the possible strategic options or behaviour of national governments (Keohane 1984; Ward 1996; Paterson, 1996a; Biermann 2005).

By maintaining: (i) a rigid divide between the national and the international; (ii) a purely rational or utilitarian conception of motive; and (iii) a state-centric account of agency, regime theory manages to provide a neat and parsimonious account of international co-operation. The functionalist strand goes even further to increase its attraction by making allowance for modicum of changes in the behavior of state actors and in the outcome of international negotiations (Paterson 1996b 72; Hansenclever et al. 1997). This is possible by retaining the core assumptions mentioned above and building in the hypothesis that nation states have a wider space (zone of maneuver) under which they can compute and pursue their national interests. Enlargement of the zone of maneuver is important because it accommodates some measure of uncertainty and variations in outcomes without sacrificing the theoretical gains associated with a tight conceptualization of motive, agency and structure (Keohane 1984:4; Young 1989). In practice, this means that whereas preference over policies, that is the strategic behaviour of states, may change, preferences over outcomes remain fairly stable such that the direction and end results of international co-operative arrangements could all be fairly accurately predicted per time (Keohane 1989:39-40; Snidal 1985; 1986; Hasenclever 1997:23-24).

2.2 How is global climate governance conceptualized under regime theory?

It is implied in what has been said in the preceding section that under regime theory, global environmental governance is seen as an attempt by states to manage the global environment for the collective interest of all. This function, according to Vogler (2000) has two main dimensions. The first consists in the attempt to respond to the threats and challenges posed by global environmental degradation. The second involves the attempt to ensure 'efficiency and equity in the way common pool resources are held and exploited and in the way common sinks are used' (Vogler 2000:16). In other words, regime theory conceives of global climate governance essentially in terms of the management of a collective action problem (Newell 2000).

This endeavor, insofar as it is draws upon the key regime concepts, implies three things. First, the management of climate change is seen primarily as the duty of governments. The obvious implication of this notion, as pointed out by Betsill and Bulkeley (2006:146), is that regime approach 'is more consistent with government as opposed to governance'. Governments are expected to identify and bring issues to the international negotiating table, agree on response strategies and return to apply the agreed rules. This perception is directly related to the notion that states are the only legitimate authority in the international arena as well as to the assumption that states have the absolute capacity to mobilize, and direct efforts of all persons and groups within their domain.[10] Second, the basic assumption under regime theory is that the primary purpose of interstate climate co-operation is for the protection of the self-interests of individual state actors. The global climate regime is thus seen mainly in terms of the attempt to avoid the classical problem of "free-riding" and "tragedy of commons" (Newell 2000:24). This assumption provides the central logic for Oran Young's (1989:199) defense of international environmental regimes in general. He says;

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[10] This perception is also partly rooted in the nature of the environmental problems that first attracted international attention most of which mainly require action from the level of national governments. Examples of such early generation environmental agreements include The Antarctica Treaty (1959) and the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of the Outer Space (see Okereke fc.)

By now, every one is aware that rational egoist operating in the absence of effective rules or social consensus often fail to realize feasible joint gains and end up with sub-optimal (sometimes drastically suboptimal) outcomes…It follows that individual actors frequently experience powerful incentives to accept behavioral constraints of the sort associated with institutional arrangements in order to maximize their own long-term gains regardless of their idea of the common good.

The emphasis, accordingly to Vogler (2000:169) is that inter-state co-operation for the environment is purely a rationalistic endeavour and 'need not be based on anything as fickle as notions of common good'. He further points out that the implication of a purely material utilitarian account of environmental regimes is that the key for the explanation of the emergence and pattern of development of environmental regimes 'is to be found, not so much in the mutual gains that become available through co-operation in an institutional setting, but in the management of mutual vulnerability' (Vogler 2000: 197). This rationalistic and "lifeboat ethics" interpretation of regimes has deep implications in the way rules, negotiations, and activities of various agencies in global climate management ought to be interpreted. Indeed, it is according to this material utilitarian interpretation that Ridley and Low (1993) argue that the way to strengthen global environmental co-operation is by tapping into the 'boundless and renewable resource: the human propensity for mainly thinking of short term interests rather than appealing to some form of rare altruistic behaviour that cost the performer and benefit someone else' (Ridely and Low 1993:3). Third, in line with the rigid divide between the national and the international under regime theory, global climate governance is conceptualized in terms of minimalist rule-based co-operation in contrast, for instance, as a threat requiring fundamental changes in the way national and international societies are currently structured and/or changes in the values that prevail within these societies (cf Paterson 1995; Barry 1999; Barry and Eckersley eds. 2005; Lohmann 2006).

2.3 Critiques

As already noted, the attraction of regime theory inheres in its emphasis on the regularized behaviour of states in international relations as opposed, on the one hand, to the anarchical conception of international politics, and on the other hand, to the highly improbable notions of world government (Keohane 1984; Young 1997:4). To this one might add the point that the exclusive focus on states and the tight conceptualization of motive makes for a neat and simplified account of regime development.[11] But despite its strength, the regime approach has important drawbacks most of which have been alluded to in the preceding sections.

First and foremost is that the exclusive focus on nation states forecloses attention on the role of actors that operate either below or above the level of the state. The analytical framework of regime theory is built to accommodate only state actors. As such, there is no space within this fame to consider the influence of environmental non-governmental organizations, corporations, transnational networks, or sub-national actors like cites and local governments in the development and function of the climate change regime (cf. Chatterjee and Finger 1994; Leggett 2000; Newell 2000; Bulkeley and Betsill 2003; Betsill and Bulkeley 2004; 2006; Levy and Newell 2005). Second, by modeling states as homogenous unitary actors the regime approach denies the relevance of internal politics and in particular the multiplicity of opinions, preferences and approaches within states that is clearly visible in the global politics of climate change (cf. Mintzer and Leonard eds. 1994; Paterson 1996b; Leggett 2000; Lohmann 2006). Third, the account of power implicit in the regime approach is zero-sum and far too crude and simplistic. The regime approach would not consider that the involvement of NSAs, even if it is limited to influencing the activities of state actors in the international arena, warrants a more nuanced account of power and authority. Newell (2000:27) endorses this point when he argues that 'if it can be shown that non-governmental actors have some influence on the interests and expectation that states bring to the process of institutional bargaining

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[11] It would have been so much easier, for example to exclude the wide range of non-state actors in the account of the development and function of the climate change regime.

in the international fora, then an important challenge is posited to the way in which we currently seek to explain policy'. At the same time, the location of power and authority solely within national territorial boundaries neglects the significance of the structure of world economy as well as the complex relationship between state and capital and how this impacts on international climate efforts (cf. Chatterjee and Finger 1994; Paterson 1996b; 2000; Leggett 2000; Coen 2005). Fourth, the conceptualization of motive strictly along the lines of rationality excludes other drivers such as value and moral considerations which are clearly part of climate change politics (Grubb 1995; Toth eds. 1999; Adger et al eds. 2006; Okereke 2006; Roberts and Parks 2007). It would seem that the more attention is paid to NSAs, the more the likelihood of identifying various motivations for the desire to participate in climate change governance. Fifth, the rigid inside/outside divide between what is seen as 'domestic' politics and that which is seen as 'international' leaves no room for appreciation of the peculiarities of environmental problems like climate change. The regime approach for, example cannot countenance the fact that the global climate is simultaneously micro and mega in scale and consequently on how actions at local and transnational levels might impinge on inter-state climate co-operation (Bulkeley 2005). Sixth and related, regime theory is basically 'single-issue focused' (Vogler 2000) and as such does not provide a means of giving attention to the interconnectedness of the environment. The regime approach accordingly would not allow space for considerations of the link between climate change and agriculture, water, tourism, housing, forestry etc. Newell (2000:27) underscores this point when he argues that the quest to provide a generic, scientific account of international co-operation and 'generalisable hypothesis that applies across issue areas' renders the regime approach incapable of appreciating the 'particular political dynamics and problem structure' that characterize climate change (cf. Rowlands 1995). Auer (2000) further stresses this point when he contends that the most important defect in applying the regime approach to the climate change issue is that the perspective does not recognize the uniqueness of the climate problematic and the need for multilevel participation needed to deal with the issue.

3. Global governance theory and non-state actors in international climate governance

The notion of global governance[12] emerged out of a certain dissatisfaction with the orthodox regime approach to transnational politics (Weiss 2000:795; cf. Wapner 1997; Ruggie 1998; 2004; Stokke 1997). At the heart of this dissatisfaction was the disinclination of the regime approach to accommodate or account for the increasing role of non-state, sub-state and transnational actors in steering global affairs (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006: 191). For the most part, it was international co-operation for the environment that offered the clearest evidence of 'the striking advances' (Young 1997:2) of non-state actors in influencing international governance, thus bringing to light the flaws of the regime approach in this regard (cf. Willets ed. 1982; Paterson 1996b; Newell 2000; Yanacopulos 2005).[13] But despite its usefulness in terms of drawing attention o the role of NSAs in global climate governance, the global governance approach provides a very limited analytical tool-kit for understanding the basis of the rising profile of these actors and the implications for core concepts like the state, power and authority in international politics.

3.1 The idea and key concepts of global governance

Governance has been defined as 'the processes that create the conditions for ordered rule and collective action within the political realm' (Stoker 2004: 22). The term has also been described as the establishment and operation of a set of rules of conduct that define practices, assign roles, and guide interactions so as to grapple with collective problems (Stokke 1997:28; cf. Young 1994:15). A more elaborate definition is offered by The Commission on Global Governance (Our Global Neighborhood 1995: ii). The Commission conceives global governance as:

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[12] We note that it is rather unsatisfactory to use the term 'global governance' to describe both a phenomenon in world politics and the theoretical approach used to analyse it, but as this is commonly done we do not break with that convention here.

[13] A lot of dissatisfaction also grew out of the overly positivistic and rationalistic methodological approaches associated with the regime theory within which the role of 'discursive practices' (Litfin 1994), critical tacit understandings and underlying global normative context are all ignored in the account of interstate co-operation (cf. Vogler 2003:23-26).

the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.

What unites these definitions (and contrasts them from the regime concept) is the removal of emphasis from state actors and, especially in the last, the explicit acknowledgement that the process of governance involves the activities of non-state actors. Olav Schram Stokke (1997: 28) underlines this distinction. He notes that:

regime analysis tends to study governance through statist lens, focusing on the creation and operation of rules in *international affairs*. The term *global governance*, on the other hand, encompasses not only those phenomena but also situations in which the creators and operators of rules are nonstate actors of various kinds, working within and across state boundaries

Analytically though, the notion of global governance owes much to the conceptual distinction between "government" and "governance" as espoused in the writings of James Rosenua (Rosenua 1989; 1995; 1997; 2000; 2002). In these works, Rosenua equates government with the authority of sovereign states and reserves the term "governance" for the numerous activities which are significant both in establishing international rules and in shaping policy through "on-the-ground" implementation even when some of such activities originate from actors that, technically speaking, 'are not endowed with formal authority' (Rosenau 1992: 6). Usually included in this group of actors are international organizations, global social movements and NGOs, transnational scientific

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networks, business organizations, multinational corporations and other forms of private authorities (O'Brien et al 2000; Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006:189).

However, much like regime theory, the concept of global governance has not been used consistently across board. Both Paterson et al. (2003) and Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006) identify at least four different perspectives. The first are those who employ the concept of global governance in more or less regime terms and accordingly perceive the roles of non-state actors as mainly complementary to those of state agents. In this framework, the concept of global environmental governance 'refers principally, if not exclusively, to the sum of the overlapping networks of inter-state regimes on environmental issues' (Paterson et al 2003:4 cf. Young 1997; Vogler 2000). Implicit in this usage is the understanding that there is little or no shift in authority from sovereign states and that the NSAs merely serve more of a mechanistic function. The second are those who use the concept of global governance to reflect utopian visions of world politics. In this view, the notion conveys a vision of the emergence of a global civil society with the possibility of supplanting the inter-state system (Scholte 2002). Here, the involvement of the civil society is closely associated with the "thickening" of cosmopolitan values and the activities of NSAs are seen as principally underpinned by a 'desire for global integration based on shared values and norms especially those of global welfare, global rule of law and global equity' (Menssner and Nuscheler 1998; cited in Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006:195). A third perspective is the one in which the involvement of NSAs is explained in terms of a collective problem solving approach by all those concerned to find effective solution to the environmental problems arising out of the uncontrolled process of economic globalization. Here, global governance is perceived in terms of 'higher levels of co-operation among governments, private institutions, non-state actors, business and 'people everywhere' in order to achieve results 'in areas of common concern and shared destiny' (Commission for Global Governance viii). This perspective, in the words of Paterson et al (2003:3) 'conveys a much looser, broader, meaning' of governance and involves an attempt to depoliticize the concept of governance and disentangle it from power and authority. The final perspective is what

Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006:196) call the "critical version" of global governance in which the concept is seen more as 'a hegemonic discourse to disguise the negative effects neoliberal economic development at the global level' (Ibid: 196). Paterson et al (2003) describe this perspective as arising on the one hand from 'the pursuit of neoliberal forms of globalization' by the state and the Multinational Corporations, and on the other hand, the 'resistance of such centralization of power' by communities, individuals and social groups (cf. Ford 2003).

Nonetheless, these perspectives are united in the sense that the notion of governance conceived in purely state-centric terms is rejected and that both the role and importance of actors below and above the level of the state are explicitly recognized in theorizing world politics (Rosenua 1999; 2000; Wapner 1997; Paterson 2003:2-4; Ruggie 2004; Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006:197). The critical argument underpinning the main body of global governance literature is that the activities of non-states actors posit important transformations in the traditional locus of power and authority in global politics and, therefore, that an adequate account of international co-operation must include the role of this group of actors (Rosenua 1992; Risse-Kappen 1995; Wapner 1997; Stokke 1997; Newell 2000; Karkkainen 2004; Biremann and Dingwirth 2004; Duffy 2005). This claim in actuality involves at least three linked core assumptions. The first is that the variety of activities by non-state actors occurring at local, national and transnational levels can be legitimately considered as acts of governance in their own right to the extent that these activities are not strictly speaking within 'the direct purview of the state system' (Wapner 1997: 66).[14] What is suggested here is not simply the involvement of actors other than states in the management of global order. But also the view that global (environmental) management itself is a much more fragmented, chaotic and loosely coordinated process than is normally implied in traditional approaches to regime analysis (Paterson 2003:1-2). A second and related claim is that governance is seen not so much in terms of institutions but more as a set of processes and social functions 'that can be performed in different times and

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[14] This claim would not apply to those who continue to see the activities of non-state actors as subordinate and merely complimentary to the state system. As already noted, scholars who use global governance in this regard do not even appreciate the fundamental claim of shits in authority (cf. Young 1997).

places' (Rosenua 2002: 72). Indeed, it is this shift in emphasis from institutions to processes that clears the way for global governance scholars to highlight the different roles of various actors and 'the authority they are able to bring to bear' (Sending and Nuemann 2006: 654) on the task of policy design and implementation. The third claim which draws from the previous ones, is that it is now possible to speak in terms of shifts in power and authority from states to non-state actors both at the national and international levels (Gordenker and Weiss 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Rosenua 1999; 2002; Scholte 2002). Here, the concept of global governance emphasizes new relevant actors, new forms of authority and new modes of interaction and transactions between these authorities (Leaonard 2005: 163; cf. Rosenua 1999:289). More explicitly, it implies 'a fragmengrative world view' rooted in 'the lessening of [states] ability to evoke compliance and govern effectively' (Rosenau 1997: 173). Particularly noteworthy is the fact that power, much like in regime analysis, is conceptualized in zero-sum terms. The implication of this underlying assumption is that once non-state actors are gaining power, states must be loosing. These, in effect are the three assumptions that underpin the global governance theorists rather bold claim that the world is experiencing a transition from international to 'post-sovereign' (Karkkainen 2004) or 'postinternational' politics (Rosenau 1989:3; 2000:219).

3.2 Global governance approach to international climate co-operation

Global environmental governance theorists argue that their perspective represents an important corrective to the traditional regime approach in a number of ways (Wapner 1997; Young 1997; Auer 2000; Leonard 2005). Four are highlighted in this section. The first is simply that the concept is a better 'heuristic device' (Weiss 2000) for capturing observable phenomenon. In other words, that it is terminologically superior to 'inter-national co-operation' to the extent that it conveys the reality of a situation in which a myriad of actors actually take part in the negotiation and implementation of multilateral environmental agreements. As Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006: 191) put it, the term acknowledges that 'a plethora of forms of social organization and political decision-

making exits that are neither directed towards the state nor emanate from it'. Hence rather than focus solely on international climate institutions, such as the UNFCCC and the related Kyoto Protocol, a governance approach would 'refer to all purposeful mechanisms and measures aimed at steering social systems towards preventing, mitigating, or adapting to the risks posed by climate change' (Jagers and Stripple 2003:385).

Second, it is argued that the global governance lens makes it possible, to bring into focus the wide range of interests and motivations including survival, distributive equity, profit, aesthetic and inter-temporal concerns that are brought to bear in the process of regime development. This implies a departure form the rational utilitarian conception of motive associated with the regime approach. John Vogler underscores this point in his critique of regime theory in relation to environmental governance. He notes that 'rational choice assumptions cannot encompass the whole range of human motivations and values and particularly in relation to environmental politics' (Vogler 2003:27). He continues by insisting that 'Politically significant ideas of environmental justice or wilderness values are largely inaccessible to rational choice analysis' (Vogler 2003:27). This arrow apparently drives home since it is evident that the interest and participation of NSAs in current international climate change emanate from a wide range of motives including inter- and intra-generational equity, environmental ethics, various notions of ideal human-nature relationship, health and cultural concerns (Wilk 2002; Paterson 2003; Paavola and Lowe eds. 2005; Adger et al. eds. 2006).

Third, it has been argued that the concept of global governance makes room for emphasis on multilevel interplays and issue-linkages in the understandings of approaches to global climate politics (Wapner 1997; Newell 2000; Jagers and Stripple 2003). Thus, while the concept of regime refers to 'more specialized arrangements that pertain to well defined activities or geographic areas and often involve only some subset of the members of the international society' (Young 1989:13; cf. Vogler 2000:23) the notion global governance, in contrast, emphasizes issue-linkages and the interactions between different levels or scales of governments from local to international (Young

1997; 2002). Furthermore, emphasis on the relevance of inter-linkages and multi-scale responses call attention to an understanding of the term "global" 'as a causal category rather than a spatial one' (Paterson et al. 2003:4). This means that the term "global environment" refers not only 'to those environmental phenomena with global scope but also to those whose causal dynamics are shaped by other global processes such as economic globalization' (Paterson et al. 2003: 4).

Fourth, the concept of global governance builds on the notion of the reality a global civil society and thus points to the importance of norms, values and beliefs in international climate politics (Wapner 1997; Hough 2003; Paavola and Lowe eds. 2005; Lipschutz 2005). In this way, it draws out the similarity between the domestic and the international arena, highlights the importance of the international society and rejects the rigid outside/inside divide which has been a standard assumption in IR / regime literature for long (Paterson 1995; Vogler 2003).

3.3 Critiques

It would seem that the concept of global governance, in general, offers some important correctives to the regime approach and provides a promising base for theorizing the involvement of NSAs in international climate politics. We say a "promising base" because global governance literature still has a lot to clarify with respect to the core concepts and assumptions that underline the scholarship. Indeed the literatures on global governance have done a lot to highlight the role of agencies below and above the level of the state in steering international climate policies as well as the value of informal practices and multilevel interplays in this process. But they do not engage critically with what these might mean for how we might conceptualize the state, its relationship with civil society or the forms and relations of power and authority implied in the process of global governance (Sending and Neumann 2006:654).

As we suggested above, the principal claim of the global governance literature is that non-state actors are new relevant players in the international arena and that states are losing power to these new groups of actors (Rosenua 1992; 1997:173; 2000; Wapner 1997; 78-9; Leonard 2005:163).

However, several questions can be raised regarding these claims. Three (at least) would seem especially important. The first relates to what Barry and Eckersley (2005:3) call the 'critical independence' of NSAs. Here questions are raised about the extent to which NSAs can be regarded as '"governors"' (Jagers and Stripple 2003:385) simply on the basis that some of the activities of these actors have not been directly authorized or sponsored by the state (Hunold and Dryzek 2005; Conca 2006). The second and related question borders on the validity of the claim that states are losing power to non-state actors or that the activities of NSAs, insofar as they are not strictly 'within the purview of the state' (Wapner 1997:66) directly amount to the shift in the powers and authority off the state (see Bernstein 2001; Levy and Newell 2002; 2005; Lipschutz 2005). Clearly, this claim, as noted before, implies the conceptualization of power in zero-sum terms such that 'an increase in the power of non-state actors is ipsofacto defined as a simultaneous reduction on state power and authority' (Sending and Neumann 2006:652). Moreover, this claim is rooted is the conception of state as "black boxes" – a conception which global governance scholars themselves have criticized (see Stokke 1997). Third, if indeed there are shifts in locations of power and authority from states to non-state actors, what is the basis of this phenomenon and where is the change leading? In other words, how much change are we really experiencing in the international sphere and what is the qualitative difference between the so-called new order and the pre-existing order?

Current literatures on global governance are either simply silent or very tame in their take on these questions. Thus far, the focus of the literature is insistently empirical and descriptive while little attention is paid to analysis and conceptualization. Accordingly, to the extent that these theoretical challenges are even acknowledged, their treatments are extremely diffuse and woolly. This is all the more important because nearly all the global governance theorists continue to admit that the state remains the central actor in the global arena. Wapner, for example clearly admits that 'states remain the main actors in world affairs, and their co-operative efforts to establish regimes remain the essential building blocks of global governance in environmental and other issues' (Wapner 1997:67).

Indeed, with the expectation of few critical works, the global governance literature display a general lack of attention to the *basis* of the emergence and rising influence of NSAs in global governance and what these mean for power and authority in the international arena. And yet as James Rosenua ([1966] 1980: 118) himself once said in the service of another argument:

> To identify factors is not to trace their influence. To uncover processes that affect external behavior is not to explain how and why they are operative under certain circumstances and not under others. To recognize that foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors is not to comprehend how the two intermix or to indicate the conditions under which one predominates the other

Indeed the general lack of attention to these pressing theoretical concerns has led some to question the extent to which is correct to regard global governance as an alternative theoretical perspective (cf. Strange 1989; Finkelstein 1995). For Sending and Neumann (2006: 653) it is not so much that global governance literatures are inattentive to these concerns but that 'their ontology and concomitant analytical tools are not equipped' to deal with the relevant conceptual issues. They point out that the commitment of the extant global governance literature to the 'changing roles and power of states and nonstate actors' (Sending and Neumann 2006: 654) as well as the conceptualization of power in zero-sum terms ultimately results in an insistent focus on types and identities of actors and the degree to which power flows from one actor to another. In their view, this approach virtually entails that the thinking and actual dynamics of governance modalities are ignored. Moreover, they assert that in defining authority as 'the capacity to generate compliance' (Rosenua 2000:188), the studies 'inadvertently perpetuate the very state-centric framework that they seek to transcend' (Sending and Nuemann 2006:655).

There are at least two reasons that may go to explain the slow progress in addressing the conceptual issues that follow the involvement of non-state actors in international climate politics.

The first is that whereas it seems clear that grand traditional IR theories such as idealism, realism and liberal institutionalism have limited purchase in explaining this phenomenon (some might prefer to say that they do not wish to de dragged down to the level of "low" sub-state actors), there remains a discernable degree of reluctance by mainstream IR scholars to "apply" unorthodox theories in explaining the phenomenon. Perhaps this reluctance has also something to do with the desire to preserve the traditional boundaries of the IR subject discipline which is insistently state-centric. Hurrel and Kingsbury (1992:6) Vogler (1996:2) and Dyer (2001:106) have all in the service of different arguments pointed out that whereas it is admitted that global environmental governance poses a series of new challenges to the 'abiding assumption' and conventional approaches in the study of International Relations (Hurrell and Kingsbury, 1992: 6; Vogler, 1996: 2; Dyer, 2001: 106) certain reluctance towards diversity and theoretical integration remains. The other reason is that IR scholars have always felt the need to defend or explain things on the basis of one clear cut generalisable theoretical perspective. Since eclecticism is hardly celebrated within the subject discipline, there is enormous pressure to either ignore or to mangle evidence in order to make them fit ones preferred analytical framework (cf. Waltz 1979; Dyer 1989:173; 2001:126; Buzan and Little 2001:30). However the salience of international climate politics especially in the context the changing global order invites serious attention to the issues of power, agency and structure that so apparently determine the success or otherwise of existing efforts. Specifically, the changing order invites the employment of theories that seriously considers the nature of the state, the agency of non-state actors as well their relationship with the state, and the complex nature of power and authority. It is to this end that we propose the integration of insights from neo-Gramscian perspectives and governmentality theories.

4. Neo-Gramscian ideas and non-state actor involvement in climate change governance

Gramscian concepts offer a means of explaining the dynamics of NSA involvement in global environmental governance for a number of reasons. First, the perspective recognizes the 'agency of

the civil society' (Wapner 1997: 78) and actors other than the state in shaping policies and managing collective problems (Gramsci 1971; 1995; Cox 1983; 1989). Indeed, as we shall see, the notion of the state in Gramscian terms is far more complex and less bounded than is suggested by the previously discussed approaches. Second, the approach has a broad conception of power which makes it useful for capturing the dynamic nature of the issues of authority, legitimacy and autonomy implicated in the rising involvement of NSAs in climate change governance (Lee 1995; Levy and Newell 2005). Third, Gramscian ideas are sensitive to the complex relationship between structure and agency and to intricate connection between state, capital and social institutions. Fourth, Gramscian concepts 'put emphasis on the process of political contestations and compromise' (Levy and Newell 2005:49) as well as the role of cognitive-ideational factors in this process (Bernstien 2001:15). Finally, Gramscian ideas provide conceptual link between the national and the international and thus enable us to transcend the rigid inside/outside dichotomy imposed by traditional approaches to regime analysis. The term neo-Gramscian is used here because Gramsci did not personally organize his writings into a coherent system of thought nor did he devote his works to explaining international institutional politics. Rather, the usefulness of Gramscian ideas is in the insights his core concepts provide in the analysis of the present social structural order (cf. Levy and Newell 2005:65).

4.1 Keys ideas and concepts in Gramscian perspective

A neo-Gramscian account proceeds from the core political economy postulate that the form of a polity and, by implication, its analysis is best situated within the context of class formation, class struggle and social relations of production. Its innovation lies principally in its construction and interpretation of the modalities of the relationship between the state, the dominant class and the civil society (Gramsci 1971; 1985). This is a complex issue, and we will only indicate the basic idea here. Contrary to a classical political economy formulation where the relationship between the historic bloc (the ruling alliance in the form of states, classes or transnational actors) and the subordinate classes is characterized in terms of struggle and dominion (Paterson 1996b; 2000, McCarthy and

Prudham 2004; McCarthy 2004), a neo-Gramscian account posits a far more dialectical and complex relationship in which, among other qualities, the lines of distinction between the ruling elite and the civil society could be so blurred as to warrant their being termed two different aspects of the same social order. The principal element in this thought is the Gramscian concept of (cultural and ideological) hegemony.

For Gramsci, hegemony is successfully established when a dominant class is able to link its interests with those of the subordinate classes in the pursuit of a social order that reproduces its own dominant position (Gramsci 1971:1181; Cox 1983). Accordingly, the successful establishment of hegemony implies that the ruling class need not enforce discipline by coercion but rather that hegemonic stability is rooted in *consensus* as manifested in the everyday operation of the institutions of the civil society.[15] This is possible because much of the subordinate classes have come to accept the hegemonic project as their own even though in critical terms the project serves to reproduce the dominance of the ruling elite.

To achieve hegemony, Gramsci insists that the small elite seeking dominance must move away from its 'narrow economic-corporate interest' to form alliances with a variety of other forces. This move requires making a number of non-core threatening compromises (Simon 1982:37). Moreover, this alliance must in addition to the control of the core structures of production and polity also provide both moral and intellectual leadership. Leadership is contrasted with coercion and forms the basic form of authority of the historic bloc (Cox 1983: 137; Lee 1995:150; Jessop 2002; Levy and Newell 2005:49-50).[16] Moral leadership refers to setting the "tone" on what is right and wrong and what is considered acceptable and unacceptable ways of life in the polity. Similarly, intellectual leadership refers to the ability of the elite to set the tone and control public opinion on what is considered feasible and unfeasible ways of dealing with the political economic issues in the

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[15] It is important to note that in Gramscian framework consensus does not mean harmony or active agreement; rather it simply implies absence of active resistance.

[16] Gramsci does not deny the importance of the coercive instruments of the historic bloc in maintaining disciple but insisters that leadership is the main and for that matter the more effective form of power (see Gramsci 1971; Cox 1983: 137).

society. This way, the hegemonic class is able to define the "limits of possibility" within the polity but also to set its interest in universal terms. This important process, for Gramsci, is normally accomplished via all the social institutions of the society including the school, the council, the media and the church all of which, to the extent that the hegemony has been successfully established, become the handmaiden of the historic bloc.

Paterson (2000), Leggett (2000), Bernstein (2001), Liverman (2006) Lohmann (2006) and Liverman and Vilas (2006) have all provided detailed accounts of various aspects of climate change governance which show how the prior commitment to the neoliberal economic order serve to shape debates on what states and NSAs can and cannot do in response to the threat of climate change. All of these observations can be seen as consistent with the working of the hegemonic neoliberal narrative that there is no alternative to market (cf. Paterson 1996b; Okereke 2006:735).

But crucially, Gramsci is also very sensitive to the role of the social institutions and civil society as the sites for counter hegemonic struggles. In other words, a complex and dialectical relationship is posed where the social institutions and the civil society become as Ford (2003:132) puts it, 'simultaneously a site for the maintenance of, as well as challenges, to hegemony'. Moreover, this dialectical relationship helps to recognize 'the importance of agency and strategy in challenging groups with superior resources' (Levy and Newell 2005:51) but also the constraints imposed by structural forces in the path of change (Paterson et al. 2003; McCarthy and Prudham 2004; Holifield 2004; Lohmann 2006).

Critically, a neo-Gramscian perspective completely rejects a 'one-dimensional' (Lukes 1974) or zero-sum notion of power. Rather than see power as residing permanently with, or as a unique characteristic of, specified entities, Gramsci conceptualizes power in terms of the 'configuration of forces relative to each other and to adversaries' (Levy and Newell 2005:51). In this view, power derives from social identities as much as it arises from structural forces (Jessop 2002). Thus, power is broadly 'implicated in the constitutions of the conditions of interaction' among the different forces within a given social order (Isaac 1987:74-5; quoted in Lee 1995:148). It follows as Lee (1995:

148) explains, that 'unequal power relations and conflicting interests may exist where the consent of the subordinate groups is achieved'. Moreover, this implies that a proper understanding of the location of power lies in a thorough reading of the alignments and matrices of the key elements or forces that animate or oppose a given a socio-political and economic order.

4.2. Neo-Gramscian ideas and global climate change governance

From a neo-Grasmcian perspective, the proliferation and involvement of NSAs in environmental (climate change) governance is rooted in two related developments. The first is the crisis of the mixed economy and the Keynesian welfare system in Western democracies. The second is the internationalization or globalization of world economy along neoliberal lines (Wapner 1997: 70; Jessop 2002:452; Levy and Newell 2005). Moreover, from this perspective, the character and orientation as well as the limits and capabilities of any given NSA is explained mainly in terms of its relationship with the state (cf. Barry and Eckersley 2005; Hunold and Dryzek 2005:75-88) and its position within the prevailing relations of production and other prevalent social structural arrangements that define the existing world order (Cox 1983; 1989; Lee 1995:146-150; Levy and Newell 2000; 2005).[17]

The push for greater free market economy in western democratic countries has a long history and different dimensions. It is generally held, though, that the chief drivers were the aggressive neoliberal monetarist economic reforms in key Western states and the concomitant re-alignment of social structural forces needed to stabilize the new order (McCarthy 2004; McCarthy and Prudham 2004; Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005). These reforms and realignments involved firstly, massive changes in the forms of ownership of material and cognitive-ideational production capacities, and, secondly, substantial transformation in the forms and functions of the state (Paterson 2000; Jessops 2002; 2007). With respect to the former, the direction of change was mainly

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[17] Hence, a neo-Gramscian approach would make a qualitative distinction between actors like World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) or World Resource Institute (WRI) with enormous resources and proximate relationship with the ruling elite and the World Council of Indigenous people.

in form of movement away from common ownership of key public utilities towards the acceptance that free market should provide 'the optimal organizing mechanism' (Lapavitsas 2005:30) for national and global economies. This rationality is therefore expected to underpin the efforts to respond to changes in the global climate regardless of the type or identity of actors involved. With regards to the latter dynamic, the main change was in the form of the reduction in the size of government through privatization and downsizing according to which the core function of government changed to encouraging self-entrepreneurship and providing rules and guidelines needed to effectively organize the new relevant actors (Josselin and Williams 2001). It follows, here, that a sizable percentage of government's involvement in climate change governance could be indirect, significantly involving the mobilization and coordination of other actors provided that the core interest of the historic bloc is preserved.

Furthermore the emphasis on competition, profitability and efficiency not only leads the self-entrepreneurial government to mobilize and use of businesses, private-public partnerships and non-governmental organizations as replacements for many of the functions traditionally performed by the administrative liberal state, it also leads to the encouragement of decentralization and greater regional/ local autonomy (Rhodes 1996:563; Christoff 2005; Paterson and Barry 2005). It is this logic that explains, for example, the increasing profile of actors such as Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) and International Council for Local environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) (see Bulkeley and Betsill 2003; Betsill and Bulkeley 2006). It is of course apparent that not all NSAs are actively mobilized by the state as mechanistic tools for the governance of climate change. Some have developed to insatiate the space created by limited government and subsequently sought to influence policies on various issues and fronts. Moreover the neo-Gramscian perspective is sensitive to the existence of 'bottom-top' counter-hegemonic actors like the Indigenous groups who mobilize mainly to oppose the dominant paradigm. The key fact remains though that the basis of their more active involvement in governance – working to formulate or refine policies, as well as in actual

implementation – lies in the political space that arose as a result of changes in the logic of the state, government structure and changes in state capital relations.

The foregoing account implies a far more cautious view on the much vaunted power and authority shift from the state to NSAs. Insofar as it is assumed that the historic bloc leads by consent rather than by coercion it follows that talks of diminishing of state authority might be overstated. Of course it remains the case that the activities of these actors are important in explaining policy direction and change, but it is not the same as saying that it amounts to power erosion. If, as it appears, much of the activities of these actors are mobilized by the government who also regulate such activities, it may be that in the end, it is the orientation of the state towards these groups that actually determine their critical independence (cf. Barry and Eckersley 2005; Hudson and Dryzek 2005). And if this is the case, then it might be that what we have is more akin to transformations in the form of the state rather than to diffusion in the power and authority of the state. Further, if the intimate relationship between capital and state is acknowledged, it would follow that the increasing influence of corporate actors and MNCs is consistent with states' interests rather than posing a danger to state authority.

It is indeed on the basis of these critical assumptions that neo-Gramscians tend to look beyond the microphysics of 'local' power play to focus on the end result of negotiation and outcome of policies (Bernstein 2000; 2001; Levy and Newell 2000; 2005; Ford 2003). Proceeding from this, they point out that there has been no fundamental change in the overall direction of climate policy following the involvement of these actors, and neither can any such radical change be reasonably envisaged (Lohmann 2006). In this case, the overarching commitment is the 'promotion and maintenance of the neoliberal economic order' (Bernstein 2001: 4) and the activities of these NSAs cannot really be said to constitute a fundamental challenge to the historic bloc. Indeed, they claim that much of the contestations and compromise occur within a limit set by the commitment to the prevailing economic model and state capital relationship (Paterson 1996b; 2000; Bernstein 2001;

Ford 2003; Lohmann 2006). Hence, they are not strictly speaking involvements capable of causing radical/fundamental changes in the structures of production and the prevalent social order.

4.3 Critiques

Not withstanding the insights offered by the neo-Gramscian ideas, the approach does have some drawbacks. Some of these have been articulated in the literature. Bernstein (2001) for example acknowledges the utility of the neo-Gramscian approach in identifying the underlying class interests and structural forces that shape international environmental policies. However, he insists that the approach performs less well in explaining the 'actual dynamic processes' through which these interests are legitimized. Similarly, in terms of governance, it would appear that while neo-Gramscian concepts are able to capture the macro-structural factors that determine the end-result of policies, they are less able to account for the constellation of micro socio-cultural dynamics that so often determine how a given policy plays out in the local level.

Bernstein (2001) further argues that the neo-Gramscian approach ascribes too much importance to the role of capitalist development and relations of production while ignoring the role of values and norms in the development of environmental institutions. It is of course a moot question as to what exactly is the role of class and economic interests in the development of international climate policies, but what is more certain is that the overwhelming emphasis on interest definition makes the neo-Gramscian approach incapable of grasping the role of moral values and norms in shaping international climate efforts (cf. Okereke 2006).

Another critique discussed by both Bernstein (2001) and Levy and Newell (2005) is that despite acknowledging the agency of the civil society, the neo-Gramscian approach might be still read as being too deterministic. Bernstein (2001:16) worries that the approach might be construed in terms of a passive struggle 'where classes empowered by the current mode of global production ultimately triumph' above the groups with less resources. It is true that the neo-Gramsican approach places emphasis on the top down structures of governance and on the structural constraints in the

path of change, however a thorough reading as indicated by Levy and Newell (2005:51) makes it clear that Gramsci allows for the 'role of agency and strategy in challenging groups with superior resources'.[18] Gramsci fully acknowledges that the relationship between the hegemonic group and the subordinate classes is very active and dynamic consisting in series of moves and counter moves intended to negotiate and renegotiate the "limits of possibility" and ultimate form of policy. The problem though is that because structure and agency are posed as having a mutually determining relationship, it is difficult to pin point the chains of causation (Uitermark 2005).

Finally, Wapner (1997) highlights the difficulties involved in transposing the Gramscian idea of civil society in Western democracies to the global level. He acknowledges the position of a number of scholars who have argued that the concept of civil society is historically specific such that it makes little sense to speak of a global civil society. However, Levy and Newell (2005:54) note that while much of Gramsci's writing focused on the national context, he nonetheless recognised that 'capitalism and class consciousness traversed national boundaries' such that the approach does have potent application in analysing international relations. Moreover, as Wapner (1997:73) notes, the concept of the global civil society retains analytical importance 'when it becomes apparent that the same type of space as well as similar affections and relations that define society at the domestic level are prevalent at the global one'.

5. Governmentality and global environmental governance

The notion of governmentality was coined by Foucault to capture the 'rationality of government' (Gordon 1991: 3); the logic, technique and 'socio-political functions and processes of governance' (Sending and Neumann' (2006:651). Foucault's concept of governmentality was developed in the context of an analysis of the changes in statecraft which took place between the

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[18] Gramsci himself warns explicitly against deterministic structural accounts of history. He says: 'The active politician is a creator, an initiator; but he neither creates from nothing nor does ho move in the turbid voice of his own desires and dreams. He bases himself on effective reality… but does so in order to dominate and transcend it' (cited in Levy and Newell 2005:51).

sixteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe (Bryant 2002: 270; Sending and Neumann 2006). This led him to an account of the 'reason of the state',[19] the *hows* of governance and the relationship between government and civil society. With its focus on the nature and processes of governing, theories of governmentality provide a promising perspective for conceptualizing climate change governance beyond the regime.

In these approaches, government is understood not as the apparatus of the state per se but rather as "the manifold ways in which the conduct of individuals and groups are directed" (Triantafillou 2004: 4). Government therefore entails the sum of the processes and activities 'aiming to shape, guide, or affect the conduct of some person or persons' (Gordon 1991:2) or what Foucault (2000:341) terms the 'conduct of conduct'. The focus on the processes, techniques and practices of governance implies that Governmentality scholars are concerned not with the location of power and authority as such, but how it is exercised. Accordingly, a global governmentality perspective, unlike other accounts of global governance, allows the analyst to engage with how governing is accomplished in practical and technical terms and the notions of power implied in this process. Indeed, by regarding government as just one means of power and acknowledging the multiple actors involved, the approach avoid the traps that zero-sum concepts of power create. On the other, hand, it has been argued that the governmentality perspective is largely insensitive to class divisions, overt power struggles and resistances that sometimes characterize socio-political relations (Raco and Imrie 2000). A related critique is that the approach implies a voluntaristic view of decision-making process and therefore 'fails to take full account of the importance of the properties of the institutional context in which authorities operate and which facilitates as well as constrains action' (Uitermark 2005:147).

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[19] This is not the reason of state in the realist sense by which is meant the need to protect the sovereign integrity of the state at all cost. Foucault's 'reason of the state' means the essence of the state in terms of its relevance to the citizens and the citizens' allegiance to the state.

5.1 Key concepts and ideas

Foucault's concept of governmentality has evolved through the work of a number of neo-Foucauldian scholars. Although there are a range of interpretations of the concept, work in this area basically aims to capture the 'changing logic or rationality of government' (Sending and Neumann 2006:652). This implies detailed attention to 'the operation of government both in terms of the institutions of the state and the power relations that permeate society' (Thompson 2005:323). The concept equally implies the redirection of attention 'away from the actions of representatives of capital and state who are commonly held to exercise power towards the local settings in which power actually makes itself visible and sensible' (Uitermark 2005:145).

Critical in this endeavour is Foucault's analytical distinction between sovereignty and government. For Foucault, sovereignty speaks to the power and functions of the state concerned with control over territory and the use of sanction and the rule of law as means of enforcement. In contrast, government speaks to the totality of 'the specific mechanisms, techniques, and procedures which political authorities deploy to realize and enact their programmes' (MacKinnon 2000: 295; see also Dean 1999). Government is thus 'an indirect form of rule that acts explicitly on populations rather than territory' (Thompson, 2005:324). In Foucault's words, it is: 'The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations, and tactics, that allow the exercise of this specific, albeit complex, form of power' (Foucault 1991:102).

By focusing on the processes through which governing is accomplished, Governmentality approaches are concerned with two related phenomenon – the rationalities and technologies of government. Governmental rationalities 'define both the objects (what should be governed) and nature (how they should be governed) of government, in effect rendering reality governable through the collecting and framing of knowledge' (Bulkeley et al. fc). Governmental technologies 'both make rationalities "visible" and permit their extension through time and space' (Murdoch 2000: 505). Current thinkers in the field of governmentality define the present era as one of advanced liberal

government and suggest that two forms of governmental technology are critical to its operation (Dean 1999; Haahr 2004; Raco and Imrie 2000). First, technologies of performance, which seek to determine what counts as relevant knowledge and provoke action on the ground, for example through targets, monitoring, audit processes and so on. Second, technologies of agency, which seek to determine the nature of 'the subject' and their participation in processes of governing, and include different forms of participation and partnership, as well as infrastructures and materials through which action is created and sustained. Such technologies, serve to propagate and disseminate governmental rationalities. However, a key feature of the governmentality literature is the emphasis that governmental technologies do not merely reflect any given rationality, but are central to actively defining 'the domains which are to be governed' (Murdoch 2000: 513). This means that, 'forms of political authority and subjectivity are not determined outside of the particular rationalities and technologies of government, but are actively created and mobilized through this process' (Raco 2003; Bulkeley et al. fc). It is, in particular, this 'technical aspect of government … [which] has often been neglected in … traditional analyses of political power' (Rose-Redwood 2006: 473).

The governmentality approach draws attention to how knowledge and power are co-constituted in order to 'make social order possible and inevitable' (Bryant 2002: 271). However, while power may be seen as flowing from a centre, it is nevertheless held that its final form is 'determined by the specific socio-cultural dispositions of the local setting. Indeed a cardinal aspect of the governmentality perspective is the notion of 'bottom-up approach to social power' (Jessop 2007:34). For Foucault, then, the local level is the arena where power is felt (Peters 2001:72; Uitermark 2005:149). Essentially, government as a form of power involves: first, the use of tactics and techniques rather than coercion/laws to steer conduct (Dean 1999; Sending and Neumann 2006; cf. Foucault 1991:95); and second, the organization of society into forms and functions that enhance the welfare of the population and individual liberty without eroding the ability of the state to exercise socio-political control. In other words, the political freedom and agency of the citizens are 'considered both as an end as a means of governing' (Nuemann 2006:656; cf. Peters 2001: 76).

Adopting a governmentality approach therefore implies a focus on the empirical matter of the techniques and practices through which governing is accomplished; the identification of the 'rationality' of governing; and an appreciation of the multiple means through which power is exercised (Sending and Neumann 2006: 656-7). In order to operationalize this approach, scholars have examined the regimes of practice, 'organized ways of doing things' (Dean 1999: 17) through which rationalities, technologies, authorities and subjectivities are created and sustained (Dean 1999: 30-33). Importantly, it is argued that through these regimes, government 'is an undertaking conducted in the plural. There is a plurality of governing agencies and authorities, of aspects of behaviour to be governed, or norms invoked, of purposes sought, and of effects, outcomes and consequences' (Dean 1999, cited in Bryant 2002: 268). This multiplicity is seen in terms of competing rationalities (Murdoch 2000: 510) as well as in the co-existence, overlap, intersection, fragmentation, and contestation between, regimes of practice (Dean 1999: 21). As Bryant (2002: 273) suggests, this results in 'a number of regimes of practice which criss-cross both conventionally understood state/civil society divisions and each other' (see Bulkeley et al. fc).[20]

Governmentality is, therefore, not a practice confined to the state but one which can be undertaken by both state and nonstate actors. Given the focus on this project in seeking to examine the potential role of states and non-nation-state actors in new forms of climate change governance, the strength of the governmentality perspective is that it provides a means for examining how both types of actors seek to govern. Moreover, and critically, a governmentality perspective negates the pervasive assumption in extant global governance literature that the increasing visibility of NSAs in international governance implies that states powers are being eroded. Rather, the approach leads us to view the phenomenon in terms of the outworking of a changing logic of government characterized by competing rationalities and deep transformations in the ways by which governments get things done. In essence, this perspective shows us that 'the ascendance of nonstate

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[20] Unfortunately, in the field of global governance the use of the term 'regime' has a very specific meaning, as discussed above, so that using the term 'regimes of practice' is only bound to result in confusion within this disciplinary field.

actors in shaping and carrying out global governance functions is not an instance of transfer of power from the state to non-state actors, or a matter of the changing sources of, or institutional locus for authority. Rather it is an expression of a change in governmentality' where civil society is rendered both an object and the subject of governing (Sending and Neumann 2006: 658).

5.2 The governmentality of global climate change governance.

To date most analysts who have sought to apply and develop Foucault's thinking on governmentality have remained within the bounds of the nation-state (Burchell et al eds. 1991; Barry et al. eds. 1996; Larner and Walters 2004; Thompson 2005). However, there is no apriori reason why this should be the case. As Lipshutz (2005: 15) suggests, the 'extension of his idea to the international arena is rather straightforward'. Because governmentality perspectives focus not on the state, or government as an institution, but rather on the processes through which governing is accomplished, there is no necessary reason why this should be limited to a concern with governmental rationalities and technologies as they apply within a territorially demarcated state arena. Moreover, because governmentality is concerned with the 'conduct of conduct' there is no need to keep 'the state' at the centre of analysis, though in practice it is the case that more often than not scholars have sought to examine governmentality as a means through which state-based authorities operate (Gordon 1991; Isin 1998; MacKinnon 2000; Thompson 2005; Uitermark 2005). For example, through taking a governmentality approach Bryant (2002) suggests that non-state actors have been enrolled in to the practices of neoliberalism in ways that are deeply ambivalent. Lipschutz (2005: 15) makes a similar argument, concluding that global civil society is 'almost fully internalised within the system of governmentality that constitutes and subjectifies it, yet which GCS presumes to contest, regulate and modify through its projects.'

A 'global' governmentality which addresses both state and nonstate actors is therefore a conceptual possibility, and one which has been operationalised by various authors (see especially the collection by Larner and Walters 2005; Lipschutz 2005; Sending and Neumann 2006). To date,

however, few accounts have engaged a 'green' governmentality in order to examine the politics of environmental governance (Backstrand and Lovbrand 2006; Bryant 2002; Darier 1999; Murdoch 2000), with only limited reference to the politics of global environmental change. Taking a governmentality approach for the analysis of global environmental issues therefore requires a carefully (and defendable) consideration of what it might add to existing approaches.

Sending and Neumann (2006: 657) are specific about the advantages which they consider a governmentality approach offers the analysis of global governance. First, it provides a means for studying the process of governing. A focus on the process as opposed to actors or the 'institutionalization of political authority' (Sending and Neumann 2006: 655) enables us to transcend the state versus non-state debate that characterizes existing global governance scholarship to explore the 'microp-physcs of governance' (Peters 2001) including the techniques and practices that embody this process. This in turn would yields insights that would prove valuable in terms of policymaking. For example, a deeper understanding of the processes of climate governance would impact the choice of policies and architecture that might be considered in the design of a post 2012 climate regime. Further, as Merlingen (2006) points out, emphasis on the technologies of government provides a means for analysing the role of 'intellectual technologies' (reports, statistics, definitions etc.) in governing. The second benefit of as pointed out by Sending and Neumann (2006:657) is the fact that the governmentality approach helps scholars to identify the logic and rationality that underpin prevalent systematic thinking as well as the knowledge and technologies that 'render possible different modes of governing.' Here again, the prospect of the approach is the possibility to expose and thus focus debates on the deeper justifications or rationale upon which prevalent practices and modes of governance are based. For, example rather than concentrate on the diffusion of authority from state to non-state actors in climate governance circles, efforts might be focused on the underpinning logic of market rationality and the extent to which this rationality is compatible to ecosystemic integrity (cf Lipschutz 2005).

A third potential benefit is that the perspective promises to refigure the spatiality of environmental governance in two ways which are critical to our project. First, it can yield increased understanding of how national and international regulations are put into practice in local settings and the power or institutional dynamics that ultimately determine the "on the ground" implementation of these regulations. Such understandings would generate consideration of the factors that require attention in order to achieve a more efficient and effective climate regime. Indeed the perspective generally enables researchers to move between micropolitical sites and practices (as for example, in our case studies) and macro-political arenas (perhaps the 'regimes of practice' within which they are located as defined above). Second, as Merlingen (2006) suggests, because of its conceptualisation of power in relational (network) terms, the approach 'has the capacity to cast new light on heterarchical governance in world politics' (2006: 185). A governmentality perspective therefore allows us to move beyond the conception of architectures for global environmental governance as necessarily hierarchical (global, national, local), and recognize instead the inter-relatedness between the local and the global, and the transnational arenas and networks through which governance is taking place (see Bulkeley 2005).

5.3 Critiques

In the most part, critiques of the governmentality perspective relate not to its potential, but to how it has been put into practice. Four points are particularly worth noting in the context of this project (see Bulkeley et al. fc). First, Foucault's concern with the microphysics of power, contemporary governmentality accounts can appear to circumscribe 'the capacities of subjects to challenge, contest and modify their contexts of governance' (Raco 2003: 91) by emphasizing their totalizing, inevitable nature. In some accounts, governmental rationalities can appear to be universal and uncontestable. Second, and in a related argument, there has been a tendency to neglect 'government from below' (Herbert-Cheshire 2003: 458) so that while 'neo-Foucauldian theory provides a framework for examining how governmental programmes and technologies are received

and experienced by sub-national institutions' (MacKinnon 2000: 311), to date little analytical attention has been directed to the geographical variation in government, and the ways in which institutional structures, routinized practices, and, significantly in the case of environmental issues, infrastructural networks, mediate regimes of practice. Together, these points mean that the governmentality perspective can appear to be largely insensitive to class divisons, overt power struggles and resistances that can characterize socio-political relations (Raco and Imrie 2000). However, by explicitly including a concern for the multiple sites within which government is practiced, and recognizing the means through which rationalities are resisted and technologies disrupted, these points could be addressed.

Third, despite its promise in terms of opening up the sites and scales of environmental governance, this has been limited in practice. There has, as noted above, been an emphasis on the nation-state as the centre of governmental power, and, for an approach which prioritizes network relations, there has been little consideration of the potential multi-scalar nature of governmentalities (Uitermark 2005) and to the plural nature of 'regimes of practice'. Focusing on the complex arrangements through which climate change is governed could provide a means of extending the conceptual terrain of governmentality. Finally, taking a governmental approach is demanding empirically. It requires an analysis not only of the rationalities of government – the ways in which problems and objects of governance are defined – but also of the technologies, or practices, through which these rationalities are circulated, challenged and recast.

7. Towards a synthesis

We posit that the governmentality and neo-Gramscian perspectives share a number of conceptual assumptions and similarities that allow for them to be combined for the purposes of analyzing global (environmental) governance and specifically the case of climate change governance. The integration of the two approaches makes it possible to preserve their strengths while addressing their respective weaknesses (see Appendix 1 for a table showing how the theoretical perspectives

discussed above conceptualizes the nature of the state and of power and authority. The table also shows the ways the approaches conceives the relationships between the state and non state actors and the implication of this conceptualization for the governance of climate change).

We start by noting the differences in the ontological premises of the two perspectives. The first is that while the neo-Gramscian perspective views neoliberalism as a largely coherent ensemble of socio-political and economic philosophies governmentality scholars take the view that liberalism is neither an ideology nor a political economic philosophy (Peters 2001:73). Rather, the constellations of policies and praxis that are commonly explained as an outworking of liberal political economic ideology naturally follow, on this view, from advancements in knowledge and technologies of governance which not only necessitate changes in the logic and rationalities of government, but also invites inevitably changes in the practicalities of the art of governance. Thompson (2005:325) brings out this point well when she writes;

> Governmentality is, therefore, not a theory of how government could or should operate. It does not offer an explicit political ideology or an assessment of the success and failures of any system. Instead, it seeks to explore the historical emergence and continual evolution of the liberal democratic rule.

Hence, if anything, neoliberalism is understood in terms of a 'development between expertise and politics' (Peters 2001:73). In other words, the conception of politics is a bit more instrumental as emphasis is on technical understanding of the logic and dynamics of government. Moreover, these changes are not explained, as in Gramscian perspectives in terms of a grand ideological meta-narrative. Rather the changes are explained in terms of changes in the rationalities and technologies of government (Thompson 2005; Uitermark 2005).

The second is that the governmentality approaches rejects the notions of commonality and social bond in the civil society which is considered a very important element in neo-Gramscian

analysis. Neo-Gramscian perspectives differ from classical Marxist accounts because it emphasizes the role of cognitive-ideational forces which works to produce a sense of collective subjectivity in the civil society. As noted in Section 4, this is possible not only because the historic bloc is able to define its interest in universal terms, but also because it offers both intellectual and moral leadership making effective use of the agency of social institutions like the school, church and media. This means that the lines between the interest of the core and the subalterns become extremely blurred as the subordinate classes come to accept the interest of the hegemonic group as theirs even though, this process, in practice, serves to reproduce the dominance of the hegemonic class. Despite this characterization, the perspective maintains that the notion of political self is still largely determined by ones positioning in the production structure, and moreover, that there remains an element of commonality among the civil society which is never successfully obliterated by the hegemonic social order. The governmentality perspective on the other hand tends to reject this notion of commonality and conception of political subjectivity. Rather, emphasis is on the microphysics of self and the notion of an enterprising culture. Governmentality perspectives thus dwell extensively on the relationship between changes in technologies of government and notions of self-responsibility. It is this heterogeneous conception of the civil society and emphasis on "self" that makes governmentality scholars to shy away from the use of "social struggle" (Peters 2001). At the same time, the view of the state in governmentality perspective is far less essentialist than in the neo-Gramscian perspective.

The third point of divergence is on the account of power offered by the two perspectives. Whereas the neo-Gramscian perspective advances a personal and socially constructed account of power, the governmentality perspective has a far less personal and more diffuse account of power. It is diffuse in the sense that while it is conceded that power may flow from a center, it is nonetheless held that 'its exact form depends on local context and how the emerging policies interact with prevailing social context' (Uitermark 2005). Hence, the governmentality approach it is more attentive to the local context and how the various social, economic and cultural conditions work jointly to

determine the final form of power. In contrast, neo-Gramscian perspective exalts the macrostructures and therefore insists it is the condition of the macro that ultimately determines the condition of the micro. This inclination is well reflected, for instance, in Robison's argument that the nation states are mere 'transmission belts and filtering devices for the imposition of the transnational agenda' (Robinson 1996:19, cited in Levy and Newell 2005:53).

Despite these deeper ontological differences, it is still possible to identify number conceptual similarities between the two perspectives, which enable the construction of a integrated framework that provides means of conceptualizing the governance of climate change beyond the regime which we consider to be better than those currently on offer from either the regime theory or global governance schools of thought. These similarities lie in a broadened account of power, the nature of the state, and its relationship with non-state actors and by implication the limits and capabilities of these of groups of actors. At least three areas of overlap are discernible and we discuss each in turn below.

The self-limiting state

The first is that both perspectives concur on concept of the self-limiting state. Here, the notion of self-limiting state is differentiated form the concept of the "retreating state" to underscore the point that the states were not "forced back" by non-state actors. The concept of a self-limiting state implies, on the contrary, that much of the space within which NSAs act might have been willfully created by the state. Neo-Gramscians trace the from and administrative to the self-limiting state to the crisis of the mixed economy and the corresponding changes in the property rights and structures of production orchestrated by the historic bloc in response to this crisis. In the governmentality perspective, the main reason is said to be advances in knowledge and changes in the technologies of government. Either way, the state is still seen to be very much in the command of affairs and much of the political freedom of citizens is 'considered as a resource rather than a hindrance to government' (Peters 2001: 76). Risse (2002), Ford (2003) and Hunold and Dryzek

2005) have all provided different insightful accounts of the ways in which states have sponsored, mobilized and encouraged non-state actors to take part in the governing process of the global environment. All of these cases support the conclusion of Sending and Neumann (2006:652) that 'a governmental rationality is at work whereby the political agency of and self association of civil society emerges as a key asset for the formation of new policies and for the practice of governing societies.' It was, for example, the states of the European Union that actively placed 50% of it quantified emission reduction target in the open market and worked out both the price of carbon and how to allocate emission credits to trading companies.

Furthermore, in both approaches, it is admitted that the concept of state as a static institution is obsolete and overly restrictive. In his analysis of the politics of urban governance, Jessop consistently starts with the thesis that the state is not a static institution but a dynamic 'system of strategic selectivity…' (Jessop 1990: 221; 2002: 463). Similarly, the notion of the state as a dynamic entity is also an important aspect of the writings of neo-Foucauldians such as Dean (1999), Rose (2000) and Dillion (2007). The 'strategic selectivity thesis' is important because it negates the idea of the state as a 'homogenous entity that operates according to a single logic' and opens the space for the understanding of the 'different ways in which the state can come to serve different purposes of capital accumulation and, as such can take on different kinds of selectivity (Uitermark 2005:139). Jessop argues that while state retains key strategic roles desired to 'protect the technological and economic competencies of its productive base', parallel and complementary activities are encouraged at other levels – grassroots, local, regional and international – to build a link between economic development and social cohesion and obscure the lines between core and peripheral interest. At the same time, these multi-scalar activities are strategically coordinated (not homogenized) to 'implement key economic strategies' (Jessop 2002:463). Similarly, governmentality theories embrace the image of the state as a highly dynamic and strategically selective entity capable of taking different forms of selectivity according to the 'rational principles which are intrinsic to it' (Peters 2001:74). The platform for this move, as noted in Section 5, is the analytical distinction

between "government" and sovereignty as different forms of power (Ole and Newman 2006 cf. Foucault 1991:101). Whilst the power of the state in sovereign terms is tied to obedience to the laws, the power of the state as a government is 'a question not of imposing laws on men, but of disposing things; that is to say, of employing tactics rather than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics – to arrange things in such a way that, through number of means, such and such ends may be achieved' (Foucault 1991: 95, cited in Ole and Newman 2006:656).

We may combine the insights from both approaches to hypothesize that while a range of non-state actors may arise out of the practicalities imposed by the changing rationalities and techniques of states, most are nevertheless co-opted by the state or at least have their critical independence defined in terms of their orientation towards the state. Either way, insights into the strategies (neo-Gramsci) or the techniques (Foucaldians) of the state given by these perspectives leads to three critical points. First, it entails a rejection of the notion of "retreating state" and instead invites serious consideration on the dynamic nature of the state and the power relations implied in this process. Second, it prompts a far more cautious view on the diffusion of power and authority from states to non-state actors than that which is trumpeted in the extant global governance literature. Third, these insights suggest the need to shift from the pervasive dichotomous states versus non-state characterization to a focus on the *hows* of governance and the embedded rationality that underpin such modalities.

Beyond zero-sum concepts of power

The second point of concurrence is that both approaches do not conceive power in zero-sum terms but rather a plural and multiple conception of power is embraced. In the neo-Gramscian perspective the notion of power is one that is co-constitutive of social relations as well as implicated in relations of production. In this account, power derives from, and resides in, cultural interactions. In other words, modalities of power are not simply derivative of material calculus but also cognitive-ideational related. A socio-structural and ideational account of power invites attention on the

multitude of overt and covert as well as advertent and inadvertent ways in which power and authority could be expressed in both national and international arena. Similarly, governmentality perspectives indicate that power is neither zero-sum nor one-dimensional. Rather, a plural and multiple centre of calculation whereby both states and non-state actors are seen as possible loci of governmental power is envisaged. In relation to climate governance, these insights mean that there are many points and ways in which power and authority might be exercised. For example this may take the shape of issue definition, agenda setting, claim to specialized knowledge, influencing of public opinion, stetting the limits of possibility in terms of what can be or can not be done, capacity to implement or monitor policy etc. What is important though is that a broadened understanding of power enables us to shift from power conceived in terms of capacity to control to look at how actors (states and non-states alike) deploy their strategic resources in the bid to influence the final form of policy.

Understanding the underlying dynamics of environmental governance

The third point of concurrence is that both perspectives concede that changes in property rights, structures of production and political economy are crucial aspects in driving changes in the forms of governments and in the political subjectivity of citizens. Foucault made it absolutely clear that advances in the knowledge of political economy is key in explaining changes in the mode and rationalities of the logic of government. Part of the definition he offered for governmentality was that it speaks to '[T]he ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target populations, [and] as its principal form of knowledge *political economy…*' (Foucault 1991:102, Emphasis added). The difference of course is that while the neo-Gramscian perspective conceives of the changes in structures of production as part of grand logic designed to generate discipline and social control, perspectives on governmentality hold the view that the changes are not essentialist but explicable on the basis of a number of factors and contexts including

social, institutional and ethnographic. We can combine the insights from both perspectives to hypothesize that while the changes in the mode of the state might be rooted in advances in knowledge of political economy and in the concept of wise government; these changes at once created a situation where both the state and non-state actors seek to optimize the opportunities afforded by the new order to leverage themselves in seeking to direct affairs both at national and international levels. Following the same account we can say that while the monetarist economic reforms might not have been aimed to produce social discipline it nevertheless had (unintended) negative consequences which served to generate mistrust and opposition among affected groups. These groups in turn mobilize, and in many cases make use of aspects of the same technologies of government to orchestrate a counter hegemonic struggle. Conceived in this manner, it becomes possible to address the elements of determinism (neo-Gramscian) and voluntarism (neo-Foculadian) detectable in the respective approaches.

8. Conclusions: implications for a research agenda

Clearly the way we conceptualize the nature of the state, the notion of power and authority and the basis of the involvement of non-state actors have implications for the ways in which we choose and develop research on climate governance.

The first point that need be restated is that traditional regime approaches despite exhibiting some strength do not provide adequate means of studying either the evolving nature of architectures for climate governance or specifically the involvement of non nation-state actors in climate change regime. Second we note that the notion of global governance is a helpful concept insofar as the term serves as a heuristic device to capture the proliferation and rising profile of non-state actors in global steering for climate change mitigation. However, the paper suggests that in analytical terms, the concept does not supply us with the necessary tools required enable us to conceptualize governance beyond the regime approach. Not only does the global governance approach side-step critical conceptual issues such as the basis of the proliferation of NSAs, the critical independence of these

actors and the nature of their relationship with traditional state actors, the insistent focus of the approach on the identity of the actors and direction of power flow means that the actual dynamics of governance and how things actually get done are ignored. Further, the dichotomous characterization (sates versus NSAs) as posed by the global governance approach, albeit inadvertently, perpetuates the "black-box" idea of the state. Moreover, in conceptualizing power in zero-sum terms, the global governance approach cannot countenance with the forms of power implied in the changing rationalities of government or the dialectal relationship between states and NSAs.

Turning to the governmentality and neo-Gramscian perspectives gives us some insight into the basis of the increasing visibility of non-state actors in climate governance as well as the tools to conceptualize the changing modes of governance associated with this phenomenon. First, these approaches generate an understanding of the state that is radically different from the "black box" conceptualization implied in the prevailing accounts. By substituting our idea of the state as a single homogenous entity with a more complex one whereby the ruling elite, the dominant class and the civil society relate dialectically in ways that give rise to multiple centres of calculation, we are able to transcend the states versus non-states dichotomy and to focus on the states actual process of governance and the logic that promote such rationalities. At the same time, such an understanding of the state enables us to approach the claim of the diffusion of power from states to non-states more cautiously and to consider the possibility that the role of the NSAs might be critically shaped by state actors or even forces that are located elsewhere than in the offices of central government. Indeed, a combination of the neo-Gramscian and governmentalilty perspectives sheds light on the inadequacy of zero-sum conceptions of power as well as notions of power that are firmly linked with the coercive capabilities of the state. Together they indicate, on the one hand, that that power is both implicated in social relations as well as a function of the specific alignment of social structural forces per time, and on the other hand, that there is a distinct difference between sovereignty as a form of power and governemntality as a form of power which speaks to the totality of the

techniques, mechanisms, and procedures utilized by the political authorities in the bid to enact and realize their programmes (MacKinnon 2000: 295).

All of these with out doubt have important implications in the ways in which research in to the activities of traditional non-state actors in climate governance should be framed and developed. If, as it seems, it is the orientation of the state towards NSAs that determine their critical independence and their limits and capabilities, then, those developing research on these actors must be careful to understand the nature of relationship that exits between a given non-state actor and the state within which such actor functions as this relationship rather than a variety of endogenous factors may be responsible for explaining greater success. Moreover, the analysis suggests that states and NSAs may have a dynamic and complementary rather than an antagonistic relationship as is often portrayed in the global governance literature. For instance, its is possible to conceive the states as more important in terms of structuring possibilities while non states are more relevant in undertaking actions. For example, while the corporate actors would look unto the state to set targets and determine the price of carbon, the government would look unto the industry for implementation and new technologies needed to drive a carbon neutral economy. This suggests that there is need to pay more attention to the notion of "technical" forms of governance and the actually processes through which governance is accomplished. Furthermore, accepting the historical specificity of the state and the civil society implies that researches should be careful to note that the assumptions applied in researching a NSA in one country may not be applicable for a similar NSA operating in different country. Equally important is the need to focus on and unpick the core concepts and ideas of the general logic and rationality that underpin contemporary modes of climate governance.

Finally, in developing research on the involvement of these actors there is need to be attentive to the different categories of non state actors mentioned. The business who one might be expect to be motivated by the need for profit, the top down groups who are more organized and sophisticated in their approach and who also are closer to the government and corridors of power.

And the bottom top groups whose motivation might be more survivalist and who do not have as much access to the corridors of power.

Appendix 1. Conceptions of the state, power and relationship between state and non-state actors and implications for climate change governance.

	Nature of state	Nature of power	Relationship between state and non-state actors	Implications for climate change governance
Regime theory	Homogenous and unitary	Territorially bounded; resides in the national government	Non-state actors hardly recognized or at the most considered in the light of their influence on state actors	The business of climate change governance is placed squarely on the shoulders of state actors. Climate policies are conceived as collective action problem; the aim of co-operation is to avert mutual vulnerability
Global Governance	Homogenous but not unitary actors; the activity of non states are recognized	Power is seen as zero-sum; power is mainly but not exclusively located within states; power is not territorially-bounded;	Relationship is conceived in dichotomous terms. If non Non-state actors gain power, it is because state actors are losing it.	Literature does not indicate clear implication. Much of the reading suggests that this is a good development for climate change governance.
Neo-Gramscian approach	Very complex; intimately related to dominant class capital and the civil society	Power is a function of the specific alignment of social and structural forces per time; it is constantly contested by all the classes but much of it is wielded by the historic bloc; power is implicated in social relations	Very dialectical. The civil society can be simultaneously seen as an extended state as well as the site upon which opposition (counter hegemonic struggle) against the historic bloc is most likely to occur	More critical of the limits and capabilities of NSAs. Only incremental change can be permitted. Successful climate change response requires fundamental changes in the current matrices of social structural forces.
Governmentality	Multiple centres of calculation	Two distinct forms: sovereignty and government. Argument that government has become more central to the workings of modern statecraft. Government involves the 'conduct of conduct', shaping the right disposition of things through the use of governmental technologies. The two main technologies of advanced liberal rule are technologies of agency and technologies of performance.	State and non-state actors are seen as possible centres of governmental power. Equally, both can be the objects of governance (how governance is achieved) and the subject (what governance aims to effect).	Threefold. First, a focus on processes through which governance is accomplished rather than the actors and institutions that undertake it. Second, emphasizes the need to understand the underlying rationality of governance, and that these can be multiple. Third, disrupts existing spatiality of global environmental governance.

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